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PROGRESSIVE  GENETIC  OWNERSHIP
Jessica L. Roberts*
Recently, property law scholars have challenged neoclassical economic theory as the primary
lens for understanding ownership.  As an alternative to the all-too-familiar concepts of welfar-
ism, rational choice theory, and cost-benefit analysis, they offer “progressive property,” a school of
thought grounded in value pluralism, communitarianism, and redistribution.  To date, much of
the progressive property literature has focused exclusively on land use.  This Article tests the
versatility of this new property school by applying it to a novel context: genetic ownership.  As
with real property, discussions surrounding genetic ownership have been entrenched in the lan-
guage of neoclassical economics.  Given the proliferation of deontological concerns related to
genetic research—such as privacy, identity, autonomy, and social justice—neoclassical economic
theory is woefully incomplete as a theory of genetic ownership.  Progressive property promises a
more complete approach.  Yet this conclusion does not establish progressive property as universally
appropriate.  Certain unexpected similarities exist between land and genetic data.  Thus, while
progressive property is well-suited to situations dealing with unique objects of ownership that
raise deontological and distributive concerns, it should not necessarily supplant neoclassical law
and economics for resolving all legal disputes regarding the ownership.
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INTRODUCTION
Neoclassical law and economics has been a dominant lens in property
law for decades.1  This view is such an integral part of the property law canon
that law students typically encounter it during their very first weeks of study
when discussing the costs of fox hunting or the efficiency of whaling cus-
toms.2  Yet recently, a new school of thought—progressive property—has dis-
rupted these traditional theoretical underpinnings of American property law.
The progressive property movement challenges the dominance of neo-
classical law and economics, urging us to consider the lived human experi-
ence, not just costs and benefits, when considering normative theories of
property.3  The familiar concepts of social welfare, rational actors, and cost-
benefit analysis are such popular—and largely unquestioned—tools for
understanding the legal system that they may well escape notice.4  However,
progressive property scholars maintain that these analytical tools, which com-
prise the core approach of neoclassical law and economics, fail to capture all
the concerns at stake within ownership disputes.  Specifically, progressive
property theorists favor plural and incommensurable values over a singular
account of welfare, acknowledge that human beings are not purely self-inter-
ested rational actors, and support distributive justice over simply maximizing
net welfare.  Importantly, progressive property does not outright reject pro-
moting welfare, rational choice theory, or cost-benefit analysis.  Rather, it sit-
uates those concerns within a greater conversation about the meaning and
purpose of property.
Advocates have billed progressive property as a new school of thought.
Yet if this movement truly represents the future of property theory, it must
apply across a number of different contexts.  While a handful of progressive
property scholars have written about intellectual property, the principal
focus of progressive property since its inception has been land use.  This Arti-
cle interrogates whether progressive property might apply in other domains.
In so doing, it seeks to answer a novel and important question: whether pro-
gressive property is a theory of property writ large or whether it is exclusive to
land use.
These debates matter.  While seemingly abstract, property theories serve
a variety of real-world functions.  They justify the recognition of property
rights and articulate their boundaries.5  Property theories also explain how
1 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 COR-
NELL L. REV. 745, 750 (2009); Eduardo M. Pen˜alver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821,
822 (2009).
2 See Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 159 (D. Mass. 1881); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1805); see also JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 39–55 (7th ed. 2010).
3 For a detailed explanation of the progressive property movement and its relation-
ship to neoclassical law and economics, see infra Part I.
4 See I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115,
1152 (2008) (explaining that “[m]any implicitly or explicitly think about legal-system
design in consequentialist terms”).
5 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982).
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and why society distributes property interests among potential stakeholders.6
In other words, theory informs the most foundational question of property
law: who should own what.  And finally, property theory legitimizes existing
rights by explaining why allocating ownership interests in a particular way is
appealing or fair.7  Property theories are at once generative, descriptive, nor-
mative, and validating.  Shifting how we think about property changes how
we construe ownership and how we distribute its corresponding legal
entitlements.
Along with this debate in property law scholarship, a contemporaneous
ownership debate has been raging within bioethics.  People historically have
not had meaningful ownership rights in their genetic data.8  During a 2016
White House forum, President Barack Obama opined: “I would like to think
that if somebody does a test on me or my genes, that that’s mine, but that’s
not always how we define these issues.”9  He went on to tell participants in his
Precision Medicine Initiative that the success of the program requires
“understanding who owns the data.”10  But why?
We must resolve questions of genetic ownership because biospecimens
and the DNA they contain are highly valuable both scientifically and com-
mercially.11  Much of modern medical science hinges on access to human
tissue,12 leading to the creation of extensive private, public, and nonprofit-
run biobanks around the globe.13  By some estimates, biobanks in the United
States alone house over 500 million biospecimens, with that number increas-
ing by twenty million every year.14  Many Americans are familiar with the $43
billion per year biotech industry, much of which is built on enforcing exclu-
sive patent rights.15  However, recently the patent stranglehold that biotech
has had on genetic information has weakened, as individuals are gaining
what resemble de facto property interests in their DNA.  People who contrib-
ute specimens for research are beginning to demand “biorights,” including
rights to compensation, access, and continuing control.16
6 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEN˜ALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROP-
ERTY THEORY 6–8 (2012).
7 See id. at 7.
8 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); see also
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 70–83.
9 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Who Owns Your Genetic Data? Obama Says You Do, SEATTLE
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/who-owns-your-genetic-
data-obama-says-you-do.
10 Id.
11 See HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, DEADLY MONOPOLIES 234 (2011).
12 See id.
13 See Mark A. Rothstein et al., Comparative Approaches to Biobanks and Privacy, 44 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 161, 161 (2016).
14 Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 884 (2015).
15 See WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 48.
16 Beth Daley & Ellen Cranley, ‘Biorights’ Rise: Donors Demand Control of Their Samples,
BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/10/09/the-rise-
biorights-donors-are-demanding-control-and-sometimes-cash-exchange-for-genetic-samples
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For example, four patients, represented by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), filed a complaint against the genetic testing company Myriad
Genetics for denying them access to their genetic information.17  They argue
that Myriad violated the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act’s (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, which creates a right to access the information
contained within a person’s health records.18  The complainants underwent
genetic testing with Myriad to assess their risks related to breast, ovarian, and
other cancers.  While Myriad provided them with a test report related to
those risks, it refused to release the full set of their genetic results, maintain-
ing that HIPAA only requires the company to release data that is “clinically
actionable.”19
What might not be apparent is that this latest controversy is, at bottom, a
battle over genetic ownership.  Myriad took a significant financial hit in 2013
when the Supreme Court invalidated its patents on isolated genes linked to
breast and ovarian cancers.20  Moreover, its corner on the genetic testing
market will further decrease as many of its remaining patents expire.21  With
its patent monopoly in inescapable peril, Myriad’s most valuable asset is now
its extensive proprietary database of genetic information.22  But whether Myr-
iad can extract value from that database turns on how the law defines the
ownership interests in the genetic information that the database contains.
The way we understand genetic ownership and its underlying purpose will
undoubtedly shape the outcome of this claim.
In addition to the most recent installment in the Myriad saga, courts
have addressed the issue of property rights in genetic data head-on in two
recent cases: Peerenboom v. Perlmutter and Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd.  In Peer-
enboom, Isaac and Laura Perlmutter sued Harold Peerenboom for conversion,
among other things.  They alleged that Peerenboom conspired to obtain
their genetic material as part of a scheme to retaliate against the Perlmutters
in a neighborhood dispute.23  The Perlmutters asserted that they “have an
exclusive right of possession and ownership of the genetic information
encoded in their genetic material” and that “[b]y collecting, analyzing, and
testing their genetic material to obtain the Perlmutters’ confidential genetic
/jCbaQ2E5t6c0Qs1kcITMRM/story.html; see also Jessica L. Roberts, Biorights (work in
progress).
17 Health Information Privacy Complaint, Zeughauser v. Myriad Genetics Lab., U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights (May 19, 2016), https://www.aclu.
org/sites/default/files/field_document/2016.5.19_hipaa_complaint.pdf; see also Erika
Check Hayden, Myriad Genetics Caught in Data Fight, 533 NATURE 449, 449 (2016).
18 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2014); see also Health Information Privacy Complaint, supra
note 17, at 1.
19 Health Information Privacy Complaint, supra note 17, at 4.
20 See infra notes 253–61 and accompanying text.
21 See John M. Conley et al., Myriad after Myriad: The Proprietary Data Dilemma, 15 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 597, 599 (2014).
22 See id. at 599–600.
23 See Amended Counterclaim at 6–11, Peerenboom v. Perlmutter, No. 2013-CA-
015257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 7, 2017).
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information, Conspirators exercised an act of dominion and authority that
deprived the Perlmutters of their rights of ownership, possession, control,
and privacy.”24  Responding to a motion to dismiss from Peerenboom, the
trial court found that the Perlmutters enjoyed a property right in their
genetic information, sufficient to state a claim for conversion.25
Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd., set for trial in May 2018, deals with the release
of genetic information in conjunction with direct-to-consumer genetic test-
ing.  Michael Cole purchased an at-home DNA ancestry kit, which gave con-
sumers the opportunity to participate in “projects” run by third-party
volunteers related to their results.26  Cole signed up for nine such projects.27
After receiving a large amount of spam, he searched the internet for his
email address and found it on a website, thereby learning that his genetic test
results had been made publicly available.28  He sued the genetic testing com-
pany alleging a violation of Alaska’s Genetic Privacy Act.29  In denying the
defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the trial court ruled that
Cole had successfully shown an injury-in-fact under the Genetic Privacy Act,
as the statute includes an exclusive property interest in genetic information,
which relates to the common-law torts of conversion and invasion of prop-
erty.30  Like the Myriad complaint, Peerenboom and Cole demonstrate that con-
flicts about the property status of genetic data are alive and well.
This Article provides a case study for progressive property: the owner-
ship of genetic data.  The status of genetic ownership is in flux and interest in
personal health data—both as a resource and as a commodity—is growing.
New spheres of ownership are rare in property law.  Virtually all of the
world’s territory is already spoken for, so the possibility of a new brand of
entitlement, creatio ex nihilo, presents a particularly compelling opportunity to
apply this new school of thought.
Whether to grant genetic ownership rights is widely regarded as a ques-
tion for bioethics, the branch of moral philosophy dealing with science and
the practice of medicine.31  While consequentialism certainly has a place in
biomedical ethics,32 modern bioethics as a field regularly engages with deon-
tological concerns, such as autonomy, privacy, and justice.33  Remarkably,
24 Id. at 19.
25 See Peerenboom v. Perlmutter, No. 2013-CA-015257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 23, 2017)
(order granting in part the counterdefendant’s motions to dismiss the counterclaim and
dismissing the counterclaim in part).
26 Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd., No. 1:14-cv-00004, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101761, at *2
(D. Alaska June 30, 2017).
27 Id.
28 Id. at *3.
29 Id.
30 Id. at *9.
31 See DAVID DEGRAZIA & THOMAS A. MAPPES, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 1 (4th ed. 1996).
32 See id. at 6–17.
33 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOETHICS 13 (7th ed.
2013) (identifying four core bioethical principles: autonomy, beneficence,
nonmaleficence, and justice).
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though, the entire conversation surrounding ownership of genetic data—on
both legal and theoretical levels—has been deeply entrenched in neoclassical
economic theory with arguments almost universally framed in the language
of costs, benefits, and incentives.  I argue that a neoclassical economic
approach to genetic ownership fails on both descriptive and intuitive levels.
It does not explain why we have doctrines of informed consent and growing
personal rights in genetic data that can lead to inefficient use, nor does it
account for the intuition that we own our genetic information or for fears of
commodifying the self.  Can progressive property help shed light on this
developing area of law and regulation where a neoclassical economic frame-
work fails?
This Article argues it can.  Progressive property presents a more com-
plete perspective by considering the deontological concerns associated with
genetic ownership alongside the consequentialist ones.  However, this Article
is not merely about what progressive property may offer genetic ownership.
In exposing the hidden hegemony of neoclassical economic theory within
this important bioethical debate and offering progressive property as a mean-
ingful alternative, this Article also seeks to contribute to the conversation
regarding progressive property as a theoretical lens beyond land use.  A
robust theory of progressive genetic ownership reveals progressive property’s
flexibility.  Yet establishing progressive property’s usefulness beyond the
familiar context of land use does not demonstrate its universal appeal.
Genetic data and land share certain surprising commonalities, such as their
uniqueness, their connection to families and communities, and their
intergenerational significance.  It is these similarities that make progressive
property appropriate in both contexts.  Yet when the object of ownership is
fungible and held purely instrumentally to facilitate financial gain, neoclassi-
cal law and economics remains an appropriate theoretical lens.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the rise of progres-
sive property as a response to the dominance of neoclassical law and econom-
ics within property theory and introduces the concept of genetic ownership.
Part II asserts that, despite bioethics’ deontological overtones, neoclassical
law and economics has also been the primary theoretical lens for arguments
both for and against entitlements in genetic data.  Thus, the dominance of
this frame extends beyond land use.  Part III then shows how neoclassical law
and economics fails both descriptively and intuitively to explain genetic own-
ership.  Finally, Part IV advances a progressive property approach to resolving
controversies over genetic data, thereby proving its theoretical versatility.
The Article concludes by offering some insights regarding when progressive
property is appropriate—and by contrast when neoclassical law and econom-
ics is sufficient—for deciding property disputes.
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I. OWNERSHIP DEBATES
Transformative debates are happening within property theory.34  A
group of scholars has challenged the hegemony of neoclassical law and eco-
nomics within property law and has offered an alternative framework.  How-
ever, despite the formative changes in the thinking surrounding property
and ownership, perhaps one of the most exciting modern debates about
these kinds of rights has gone largely unnoticed by property law scholars.  It
is the conflict surrounding the ownership of genetic data.  This Part explores
progressive property as a response to the dominance of neoclassical eco-
nomic theory and then introduces the central controversies and entitlements
that characterize genetic ownership.
A. What Is Progressive Property?
A vast and diverse range of scholars and theories could fall under the
umbrella of law and economics.  Like the progressive property scholarship
that inspired it, this Article responds specifically to a neoclassical economic
approach to ownership, derived in part from the work of economist Harold
Demsetz.  Progressive property scholars argue that, despite its ubiquity, neo-
classical law and economics falls short both descriptively and prescriptively
with respect to property law and offer progressive property as an alternative.
1. Neoclassical Economic Theories of Property
Demsetz revolutionized property scholarship with his 1967 article
Toward a Theory of Property Rights.  Unlike other economists of his day who
took property rights as a given, Demsetz attempted to explain why they
emerge by crafting what he called “an economic theory of property rights.”35
In his words, “property rights arise when it becomes economic for those
affected by externalities to internalize benefits and costs.”36  As a neoclassical
economist, Demsetz’s work rests on the three key assumptions of neoclassical
economics: (1) people seek to maximize utility; (2) people have rational pref-
erences between various possible outcomes; and (3) people are independent
actors who make decisions based on complete and relevant information.37
As used in this Article, then, the defining features of neoclassical economic
theory—which forms the basis for neoclassical law and economics—are: (1)
value monism; (2) rational choice theory; and (3) cost-benefit analysis.  We
can consider each of these guiding principles in turn.
34 See Ezra Rosser, Essay, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 108 (2013).
35 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347
(1967).
36 Id. at 354.
37 See E. Roy Weintraub, Neoclassical Economics, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECO-
NOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., 2002), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/Neoclassi
calEconomics.html.
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Because Demsetz believes that property functions to promote economic
efficiency, he focuses exclusively on how ownership maximizes the value of
the property.38  Utilitarianism evaluates the morality of a law by considering
whether it produces net welfare.39  As a consequentialist theory, utilitarian-
ism rejects the notion that particular actions might have value apart from the
utility they produce.40  Demsetz and his fellow neoclassical economists regard
property and its accompanying entitlements from this sort of instrumental
perspective.  Utilitarianism in general, and the neoclassical economic
approach in particular, has been the dominant theoretical lens for under-
standing property law for decades.41
First, neoclassical law and economics, like all utilitarian theories, evalu-
ates particular outcomes in terms of a single metric: “welfare.”42  The two
major utilitarian schools are traditional utilitarianism, which defines welfare
as a broad notion of happiness or well-being (frequently framed in terms of
preference satisfaction),43 and economic utilitarianism, which uses money
and market value as a proxy for welfare.44  Utilitarianism assumes that social
welfare equals the sum of all the individual welfare for all the members of the
society.45  Even plural accounts of welfare—definitions of welfare that
attempt to encompass multiple aspects of happiness or well-being—must be
able to distill those plural values into a single unified definition.  Neoclassical
law and economics therefore views property rights and institutions in terms
of their ability to maximize a single (monist) value: welfare, however defined.
Second, the neoclassical economic account of property assumes that
people are rational actors.  According to rational choice theory, when mak-
ing a decision, a rational actor will consider all of the information available to
her, think through the various probable outcomes of her decision, weigh the
potential costs and benefits, and then take the action that serves her own best
interests.46  The rational-actor model assumes that a person is capable of
38 See Demsetz, supra note 35, at 355.
39 See J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 4 (1973).
Utilitarianism can also focus on either maximizing positive welfare or minimizing negative
welfare. Id. at 28–30.
40 See id. at 84.
41 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 50.
42 Value monism is not exclusive to utilitarianism, as even some deontological theories
may center on a single—albeit complex—moral value, e.g., the Kantian focus on human
dignity.  Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1020
(2011).
43 See SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 80 (describing utility/happiness as prefer-
ence satisfaction).
44 See Michael B. Dorff & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Is There a Method to the Madness? Why
Creative and Counterintuitive Proposals Are Counterproductive, in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 21, 26 (Mark D. White ed., 2009).
45 See R.G. Frey, Utilitarianism and Bioethics, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2531, 2531
(Stephen G. Post ed., 3d ed. 2004); Utilitarianism, in A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (John
Black et al. eds., 5th ed. 2017).
46 See Rational Choice Theory, in A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 625, 625–27 (John Scott
ed., 4th ed. 2014).
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identifying the course of action that will offer her the most benefit and is
motivated predominantly by the desire for personal gain.  Among the key
principles of economic theory is that people respond to incentives in these
predictable, rational ways.  The rational actor is thus deliberative, self-inter-
ested, and responsive to incentives.
Finally, rational actors decide which course of action to take using cost-
benefit analysis.47  In welfare terms, rational actors will seek to maximize ben-
efits (positive welfare) while minimizing costs (negative welfare).  This model
reduces decisionmaking to a simple comparison of costs and benefits.  Cost-
benefit analysis also envisions a particular purpose for property.  It presumes
that owners’ primary goal is simply to maximize the value produced by their
land or chattels.  Yet, as Demsetz notes, because they are motivated primarily
by self-interest, rational actors are unlikely to consider all the possible effects
their conduct might have on others, thus resulting in both positive and nega-
tive externalities.48
While neoclassical economics provides a useful lens in many cases, it fails
to explain certain intuitions and behaviors related to ownership.  For
instance, it would not distinguish between an owner who recently purchased
a house as a rental property and an owner who inherited a home her family
had lived in for generations.  Instead it would predict that both owners are
motivated to extract the most value possible from their properties.  However,
our actual experience tells us that these two owners likely have very different
relationships with their respective houses.  While land’s physical uniqueness
is well-accepted within property law, land also enjoys a relational uniqueness
regarding how a given individual or group of individuals interacts with a par-
ticular parcel of land.49
There is something intuitively different between the landlord and the
heir that neoclassical economics cannot explain or predict.  In fact, research
shows that landlords and owner occupants invest their resources differently,
as do absentee landlords and resident landlords.50  Owners tend to invest
more in their homes than landlords and resident landlords tend to invest
more than absentee landlords.51  But why?
While homeowners generally seek to preserve and increase the value of
their homes, a neoclassical wealth-maximizing, rational choice model fails to
account for a significant swath of homeowner behavior.52  Why concentrate
such a substantial portion of wealth in a single investment?  It comes as no
surprise, then, that Americans attach special significance to homeownership.
A home represents more than an investment.  Even after the Great Reces-
sion, most Americans continue to believe that owning a home represents the
47 Demsetz, supra note 35, at 354–58 (describing both decisions to create systems of
property and decisions about land use as the result of weighing costs and benefits).
48 Id. at 356.
49 See Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 828–29.
50 See id. at 838.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 834.
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“American dream.”53  Additionally, Eduardo Pen˜alver shows that owners
often customize their living spaces for their own comfort or simply to express
their identities, even at the expense of market value.54  Other important
aspects of home ownership obscured by the neoclassical economic approach
include access to social goods and networks like schools, parks, and commu-
nities.55  Longtime homeowners are more likely to vote for tax increases to
finance public schools than new residents, even though their own children
have long since graduated.56  Moreover, homeowners may object to changes
within their neighborhood that would actually improve the value of their
property if they believe those changes will alter the character of their com-
munity.57  People act in ways regarding their homes and their communities
that are independent of market value.
Properly understanding why people act—not just how they act—is essen-
tial to good policymaking.  Consequently, policies that assume homeowners
are primarily financially motivated will inevitably fall short.  Take for example
the common land use problem of how LULUs (“locally undesirable land
uses”) lead to NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) objections.  A particular land
use, like creating a landfill, can have positive effects across an entire commu-
nity, yet it will negatively impact the property owners in the immediate area.
A neoclassical economic solution to a NIMBY problem would advocate com-
pensating the affected owners for the cost the LULU would impose.58  How-
ever, compensation programs have not been independently successful.59  In
actuality, they have at times increased opposition to the LULU.60
2. Progressive Property as an Alternative
Whereas the utilitarianism characteristic of neoclassical economics
focuses on promoting welfare, progressive property seeks to support human
flourishing by acknowledging the presence of plural and incommensurable
53 See Dave Fagundes, Buying Happiness: Property, Acquisition, and Subjective Well-Being, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1851, 1872–73 & n.89 (2017) (discussing the mythology of the single-
family home as the “American dream”); see also Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 835–36 (discuss-
ing the cultural and symbolic significance of homeownership).
54 Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 837.
55 See id. at 838.
56 See Michael B. Berkman & Eric Plutzer, Gray Peril or Loyal Support? The Effects of the
Elderly on Educational Expenditures, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 1178, 1181 (2004); see also Pen˜alver, supra
note 1, at 838.
57 See Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 842–44.
58 See id. at 845.
59 See Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 787, 824 (1994); Carissa Schively, Understanding the NIMBY and LULU Phenomena:
Reassessing Our Knowledge Base and Informing Future Research, 21 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 255, 260
(2007); see also Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 845.
60 See Bruno S. Frey et al., The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Mar-
kets, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1297, 1299–301 (1996); Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The
Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV.
746, 749–50 (1997); see also Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 845.
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values, the importance of community ties, and the fairness concerns raised by
disparities.61  While neoclassical law and economics uses (1) value monism,
(2) rational choice theory, and (3) cost-benefit analysis, progressive property
adopts (1) value pluralism, (2) communitarianism, and (3) redistribution.
Progressive property is value pluralist.  While utilitarians might recog-
nize the existence of other values, they view those values as merely instrumen-
tal in promoting the metavalue of welfare.  Progressive property scholars
reject the premise that all the concerns relevant to property can be con-
densed into a single, quantifiable welfare metric.62  A key insight of progres-
sive property is that property involves a mix of individual, social, and
relational values that go beyond mere preference satisfaction, including—but
not exclusively—physical security, knowledge acquisition, freedom of choice,
wealth, and happiness.63  These values also implicate the greater social values
of justice (particularly just social relationships and just distributions) and
democracy.64
Importantly, progressive property scholars also believe that the plural
values relevant to property law are incommensurable.  Incommensurability is
about more than difference.65  It is not a matter of comparing apples and
oranges or black and white, but rather attempting to compare apples and
white.  Progressive property scholars believe that because the values at stake
within property represent different aspects of the human experience, they
cannot be compared or ranked without distorting their intrinsic value.66  Plu-
ral accounts of welfare likewise fail because they take values that are inher-
ently different and distinct and attempt to distill them into a single, all-
encompassing value.  Progressive property scholars assert that human flour-
ishing as a concept is simply too complicated to be collapsed into a single
criterion, no matter how complex.  Progressive property is therefore value
pluralist.
Second, progressive property rejects rational choice theory as an incom-
plete and simplified understanding of human behavior.  Instead of placing
an individualistic, self-interested, welfare-maximizing rational actor at the
center of property, progressive property thinks in terms of communities.  As
social and political creatures, people need communities to have good lives.67
In reality, we require others to survive—a reality that is clearest during
61 See Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Pen˜alver, Properties of Community, 10 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 127 (2009); see also ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at
80–101.
62 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 98; Gregory S. Alexander et al., A State-
ment of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009); Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at
858; Joseph William Singer, Essay, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1037 (2009).
63 See Alexander et al., supra note 62, at 743; see also Alexander, supra note 42, at 1028.
64 See Alexander et al., supra note 62, at 743.
65 See Alexander, supra note 42, at 1043.
66 See Alexander et al., supra note 62, at 744; Alexander, supra note 42, at 1020.
67 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 80–81.
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infancy, illness, and old age.68  Because of the inevitable dependency and
interdependency of the human condition, flourishing is an “unavoidably
cooperative endeavor.”69  Communities are more than mere collections of
individual, exogenous preferences.  They are themselves preference-generat-
ing.70  Individuals’ communities shape their identities.  Progressive property
scholars believe that ignoring this reality eliminates the possibility of a mor-
ally distinct sense of community (i.e., an independent view of community as
separate from the collection of individuals that make up that community).71
This view of the community shapes how progressive property scholars
view the purpose of property.  On this account, property both allocates
power within communities72 and provides the opportunity to exercise certain
virtues that benefit communities, such as responsible ownership, friendship,
generosity, and moderation.73  As a normative matter, then, progressive
property scholars believe that property law should seek to enable people to
participate fully in the social and political life of a free, democratic society.74
While the community is central to progressive property, it is worth not-
ing that the importance of the community does not overshadow the interests
of the individuals within that community.  Human flourishing values practi-
cal reasoning and autonomy.75  Thus, while progressive property considers
communal well-being, it does not do so to the detriment of important indi-
vidual rights and liberties, such as privacy, autonomy, and dignity.
Lastly, progressive property scholars have taken issue with cost-benefit
analysis.  To start, weighing costs and benefits assumes that welfare is both
calculable and comparable.76  Furthermore, relying on costs and benefits for
decisionmaking ignores the other moral concerns that relate to property.77
For example, utilitarianism neglects distributive concerns.78  One action may
make some people much, much better off and everyone else just slightly
worse off, whereas another would make all people just a teeny bit better off,
but would not make any one person very well off.  Utilitarianism could situate
both outcomes as “equally” welfare-generating, so which one should we
select?79  By looking only to aggregated interests, utilitarianism hides that a
significant portion of welfare may be concentrated among a small group of
people, thereby masking even serious disparities.  Martha Nussbaum quips
that utilitarianism does not explain “who has got the money, and whether
68 See Alexander & Pen˜alver, supra note 61, at 139.
69 Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 869; see ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 87; Alex-
ander & Pen˜alver, supra note 61, at 138; Alexander, supra note 1, at 760–61.
70 See Alexander & Pen˜alver, supra note 61, at 139–40.
71 See id. at 129.
72 See Alexander et al., supra note 62, at 744.
73 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 83.
74 See Alexander et al., supra note 62, at 744.
75 See Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 870.
76 See id. at 858.
77 See id. at 860.
78 See SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 142–43.
79 Id. at 34.
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any of it is mine.”80  Progressive property scholars believe that the issues of
deep human concern raised by property law cannot, as Joseph Singer puts it,
“be reduced to a math problem.”81
Unlike neoclassical law and economics, which suggests that markets may
suffice to address distributive concerns, progressive property imagines a
more robust role for the state to assure a just distribution of resources.82
Because people need resources to flourish, according to progressive prop-
erty, people have a right to the resources necessary for flourishing.  This right
warrants encouraging—if not requiring—the state to force the wealthy to
share any surplus to allow the poor to flourish.83  Hence, progressive prop-
erty may at times require redistribution.84  As a value pluralist school of
thought, progressive property may consider both deontological and conse-
quentialist justifications for redistribution.
Progressive property advocates view their approach as more honest than
its welfarist counterpart because it reflects the kind of indeterminacy exper-
ienced in real-world decisionmaking.85  They assert that utilitarians with their
value monist theories are either sacrificing neatness for accuracy86 or are
“confused or disingenuous” regarding the complexities of human flourish-
ing.87  Utilitarians may see progressive property’s indeterminacy as a short-
coming.  As pluralists, progressive property scholars conceive of the
possibility of an irreducible value conflict as a plus because it better reflects
the complexities of the lived experience of moral choice.88  They maintain
that this feature can be understood as a strength rather than a flaw.
Importantly, progressive property does not disregard wealth or welfare.
There is plenty of room for those values within a pluralist framework.  For
instance, access to material wealth may impact a person’s ability to flourish,
making neoclassical economic consequences relevant to progressive prop-
erty.89  Human flourishing theories may then consider wealth, but those con-
siderations are not determinative: even when wealth is relevant, the right
outcome may not be the one that produces the most aggregate welfare.90
80 Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 284 (2006) (quoting MARTHA C. NUSS-
BAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 61 (2001)).
81 Singer, supra note 62, at 1062.
82 See Alexander & Pen˜alver, supra note 61, at 146.
83 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 95–96.  Alexander and Pen˜alver pro-
pose that the state should guarantee individuals “a substantial basket of resources.”  Alex-
ander & Pen˜alver, supra note 61, at 147.
84 Alexander and Pen˜alver write that “the extreme need of some in the community
trumps the property rights other people hold over their surplus resources.” Alexander &
Pen˜alver, supra note 61, at 146.
85 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 749, 805.
86 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 98–99.
87 Alexander, supra note 1, at 749.
88 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 99; Alexander, supra note 42, at 1019;
Alexander, supra note 1, at 749, 805.
89 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 97.
90 See Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 868.
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Progressive property attempts to preserve the benefits of welfarism without
succumbing to its shortfalls.91  Because welfare matters, commercial entities
will not always lose out in a progressive property analysis.92  Consequently,
the theoretical foundations of the progressive property school can be
thought of as a form of “weak welfarism”93 or as a modern, nonutilitarian
theory that maintains a concern with a broadly defined conception of
welfare.94
To understand how progressive property succeeds where neoclassical law
and economics fails, we can return to the issue of the LULUs and NIMBYism.
A progressive property approach to LULUs could well be more effective than
its neoclassical economic counterpart.  Recall that progressive property is
value pluralist, communitarian, and at times redistributive.  A progressive
property approach to siting a LULU would thus involve communication,
cooperation, and possible redistribution.  When deciding where to site a
LULU, a progressive property approach would consider the various values at
stake related to the project.  While a LULU could well reduce the market
value of the surrounding property, it could also affect the landowners’ auton-
omy by limiting their choices regarding how to use their property, their pri-
vacy by increasing workers and traffic flow through the neighborhood, and
their identities by changing the character of their community and surround-
ing areas.
Given the other values at stake, monetary compensation alone may—
and often does—fall short.  Instead of treating the affected owners as individ-
ualistic rational actors concerned only with market value, developers could
address the broader concerns of the community.  Studies show that effective
communication can increase public trust.95  When discussing the potential
effects of LULUs, people want more than just having the risks communicated
to them; they also want their fears regarding the project to be acknowl-
edged.96  Consensus building is an important aspect of overcoming NIMBY
problems,97 thus rendering progressive property’s communitarian orienta-
tion preferable to treating individuals as self-interested rational actors.
Finally, empowering the citizenry to make decisions related to the LULU has
also been effective.98  Giving the impacted landowners some measure of con-
trol related to the LULU has a redistributive feel, which is also in tune with
progressive property.  It is also worth noting that the owners of the land sur-
rounding the proposed LULU are not the only relevant parties.  The con-
91 See id. at 828, 867.
92 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 817.
93 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 97 (quoting MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC
A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 25–26 (2006)).
94 See id. at 87.
95 See Schively, supra note 59, at 261.
96 See id.
97 See id. at 261–62.
98 See id. at 261.
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cerns and values of the developers and of the greater community should also
be considered.
At times progressive property also advocates limiting owners’ entitle-
ments—specifically the right to exclude—to recognize important social val-
ues, to better serve the community, or to facilitate redistribution.  Two
paradigmatic progressive property cases have come out of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey.99  The first case, State v. Shack,100 involved aid workers
who entered private land to provide health and legal services to the migrant
farmworkers residing there.  The owner attempted to exercise his right to
exclude by asking them to leave and, when the workers refused, charging
them with trespass.101  In holding that no trespass occurred because a prop-
erty owner has no right to bar access to government services, the court went a
step further and stated that the migrant workers themselves were entitled to
access.  The justices opined that “the employer may not deny the worker his
privacy or interfere with his opportunity to live with dignity and to enjoy
associations customary among our citizens” because “[t]hese rights are too
fundamental to be denied on the basis of an interest in real property and too
fragile to be left to the unequal bargaining strength of the parties.”102  Pro-
gressive property scholars read Shack as recognizing a property right for the
workers: a right to have visitors.103  By acknowledging an access right, the
court arguably recognized the importance of health and justice, acted in the
interests of the migrant community, and redistributed the entitlements from
the landowner to the farm workers.
In the second case, Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,104 the owner
of the beach, which provided services for beachgoers, charged residents a fee
for accessing the beach but barred members of the general public.  An
adjoining township and a would-be beachgoer sued, arguing that the beach
should be subject to the public trust doctrine, which gives members of the
public the right to enjoy tidal lands.105  On appeal, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that insofar as access to private dry land is “essential or rea-
sonably necessary for enjoyment of the ocean,” the public trust doctrine
applies.106  In analyzing Matthews, Gregory Alexander explains that the
infringement on the owner’s right to exclude is limited: the public trust doc-
trine would not apply in cases where nonowners have reasonable beach
access.107  He understands this conditional incursion on the right to exclude
as recognizing the social value of recreation and the reality of human inter-
99 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 802–09; see also Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 883–84.
100 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
101 Id. at 370–71.
102 Id. at 374–75.
103 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 808–09; see also Rosser, supra note 34, at 118.
104 471 A.2d 355, 358–59 (N.J. 1984).
105 Id. at 358.
106 Id. at 365.
107 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 807; see also Rosser, supra note 34, at 117.
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dependency.108  Moreover, it serves the interests of the citizens of New Jersey
and gives them an access right where none had previously existed.
In sum, progressive property recognizes that ownership is often bound
up with human flourishing.  As such, when deciding property disputes, pro-
gressive property advocates consider the diverse values at stake, the interests
of the impacted communities, and the distributive implications.  In the con-
text of LULUs, progressive property means a collaborative, consensus-build-
ing process.  For a judge deciding a dispute over title or access to land, it
would mean accounting for the values at stake beyond wealth, furthering the
communal good, and enforcing a fair distribution of property entitlements.
B. What Is Genetic Ownership?
Neoclassical economic theory has been the dominant lens for under-
standing property for the last five decades.109  Recently, progressive property
scholars have rejected this approach in favor of a value pluralist, communi-
tarian, and redistributive theoretical approach.  While a few scholars have
briefly considered how progressive property might apply to intellectual prop-
erty (mainly patents and copyright),110 most of progressive property scholar-
ship has dealt with land.111  To truly establish itself as a school of property
thought and not merely a way of understanding land use, progressive prop-
erty must apply to broader contexts.  Genetic ownership and its newly emerg-
ing entitlements offer precisely this opportunity.  This Article seeks to test
108 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 805–07; see also Rosser, supra note 34, at 117.
109 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 200–03 (applying Aristotelian
property theory to the field of intellectual property generally); Alexander, supra note 1, at
810–18 (applying social obligation theory to copyright and intellectual property); Laura R.
Ford, Patenting the Social: Alice, Abstraction, and Functionalism in Software Patent Claims, 14
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 259, 294 (2016) (applying Aristotelian theories to pat-
ents related to social networks); David W. Opderbeck, Beyond Bits, Memes and Utility
Machines: A Theology of Intellectual Property as Social Relations, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 738
(2013) (calling for a theological grounding for social theories of intellectual property).
Additionally, in her path-breaking article IP3, Madhavi Sunder challenged IP scholars to go
beyond the law and economics frame and applied Nussbaum’s and Sen’s capabilities
approach to intellectual property. See generally Sunder, supra note 80.  However, Sunder’s
article predates much of the progressive property movement. See David Fagundes, Property
Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 702 (2010) (arguing that scholars seek
to differentiate copyright from physical property because they wrongly understand the lat-
ter to be dominated by a Demsetzian approach to ownership).
Importantly, this analysis is confined to “progressive property,” a school of thought
within property law scholarship.  Scholars have used the capability approach, which forms
the basis for progressive property, in multiple areas, including certain aspects of health
care.  Most notably, Jennifer Prah Ruger has advocated a “health capability paradigm” as
the basis for health care reform. JENNIFER PRAH RUGER, HEALTH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 80
(2010).
111 The unique complexity of land is a central component to Pen˜alver’s analysis in
Land Virtues. See Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 828–32.  Moreover, he explicitly limits his analy-
sis to land use. Id. at 823.
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progressive property’s adaptability by applying it to contemporary debates
surrounding the ownership of genetic data.
In lay terms, genes are the units of heredity,112 the biological mecha-
nisms that allow parents to pass various traits down to their offspring.  In
more technical terms, genes are molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
that store genetic information, located (primarily) in the chromosomes
found in a cell’s nucleus.113  Genes are made up of combinations of four
nucleotide bases—adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine
(T)—the letters in the genetic alphabet.114  The combinations of those As,
Gs, Cs, and Ts dictate the way in which our genes “express” themselves.115
Genetic data is simultaneously personal and communal.  It can commu-
nicate sensitive information about an individual, including a person’s ances-
try, familial relationships, presence at a crime scene, medical risk, and
perhaps even behavioral tendencies.116  Yet at the very same time, human
beings are 99.9% genetically similar,117 with even greater levels of homoge-
neity among family members.118
Genetic data is distinct from the genetic material from which it is
derived.  Genetic information is the intangible information about a person’s
genetic makeup.119  By contrast, a genetic material is a DNA sample, the
physical molecules of DNA.120  Examples of genetic material include blood,
tissue, and saliva.  Some have argued in favor of understanding DNA samples
112 Richard A. Spinello, Property Rights in Genetic Information, 6 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 29,
29 (2004).
113 Id.; Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and
Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735,
742–43 (2000).
114 Holman & Munzer, supra note 113, at 742; Spinello, supra note 112, at 29.
115 Holman & Munzer, supra note 113, at 742–43.
116 See Merryn Ekberg, Governing the Risks Emerging from the Non-Medical Uses of Genetic
Testing, 3 AUSTL. J. EMERGING TECH. & SOC’Y 1, 2 (2005); Andelka M. Phillips, Only a Click
Away—DTC Genetics for Ancestry, Health, Love . . . and More: A View of the Business and Regula-
tory Landscape, 8 APPLIED & TRANSLATIONAL GENOMICS 16, 18–19 (2016); Mark A. Rothstein,
The Use of Genetic Information for Nonmedical Purposes, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 109, 110–18 (1994-
1995).
117 See Frequently Asked Questions About Genetic and Genomic Science, NIH NAT’L HUM. GEN-
OME RES. INST., https://www.genome.gov/19016904/faq-about-genetic-and-genomic-sci-
ence/ (last updated Mar. 2, 2016); see also President William J. Clinton, Remarks on
Completion of the First Survey of the Human Genome Project 1501 (June 26, 2000),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2000-07-03/pdf/WCPD-2000-07-03-Pg1499.pdf
[hereinafter Clinton Remarks].
118 For a thoughtful discussion of how to allocate shared ownership interests in genetic
data, see Ram, supra note 14, at 909.
119 See Spinello, supra note 112, at 29 (broadly defining genetic information as “infor-
mation about genes, gene products, or one’s inherited characteristics that is derived from
a genetic test or a person’s DNA sample”).
120 Id. (defining genetic material as “any human biological specimen such as human
tissue or blood from which DNA can be extracted”).
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or other bodily derivatives in property terms.121  Yet as a practical matter, it is
hard to keep track of all the genetic material that we discard.  Every time we
touch a doorknob, drink from a glass, or shake a person’s hand, we leave
some trace of our genetic material.  It seems strange to say that we own all of
that.  Moreover, once a researcher or a company has access to a person’s
genetic information and puts that information in a database, the physical
sample is far less important, as the information itself can be sold and mined.
Hence, this Article focuses on genetic data because as an object of ownership
it is both more manageable and more valuable.  Yet given the close relation-
ship between genetic data and the biospecimens from which the data came,
this distinction is not always clear or maintainable.
1. Genetic Ownership Controversies
Who should own genetic data?  A researcher who develops an immortal
cell line from a human cancer cell might assert that she should own the
result because of her scientific efforts.  By contrast, the provider of the cancer
cell could likewise claim ownership because the cell line was made possible
by her unique genetic information.  Different kinds of entities have staked
ownership claims to genetic information.  The biotech industry holds patents
related to genetic and genomic research.  Yet that has not stopped people
who contribute DNA from claiming that the information in their genetic
code rightfully belongs to them, even absent a legally recognized property
interest.  Deciding who owns genetic information has been an ongoing con-
troversy for over two decades.  There have been several high-profile genetic
ownership disputes, which have generated litigation and media attention.
Here I outline some of the key genetic ownership controversies to provide
background for understanding the bioethical debates described in Part II.
These disputes demonstrate the hotly contested question of who owns
genetic data.
Historically, genetic ownership rights have been lopsided.  The biotech
industry has enjoyed longstanding legally recognized ownership rights
related to genetic data and its derivatives.  Specifically, researchers studying
human genetics may patent and commercialize their findings.122  Patents
grant inventors exclusive rights to make, use, and sell their inventions for a
twenty-year term in exchange for making their innovations public.123  Given
the broad scope of patentable subject matter,124 individuals and institutions
may hold patents on a wide variety of items related to genetic research,
121 See Muireann Quigley, Property and the Body: Applying Honore´, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 631,
631 (2007); Leigh M. Harlan, Note, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to Man-
date the Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 200–01 (2004).
122 The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
123 See generally WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 17–18.
124 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979,
at 5 (1952)) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
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including synthetic DNA, genetic tests, and cell lines.  However, in 2013, the
Supreme Court invalidated patents on isolated genes on the theory that
genes are products of nature and not human innovations.125
Biotech companies may also hold proprietary interests in their
databases.126  An extensive and reliable database of genetic information is
essential to both treatment and research.  Even massive amounts of genetic
data are useless if the scientific and medical communities have no means of
interpreting them.  When a testing company collects genetic data from large
numbers of people, it gains the ability to link genetic variations with health
outcomes, family medical histories, and other factors.127  Those actions, in
turn, improve the quality of the database.  As a result, genetic testing compa-
nies, like Myriad, jealously guard their databases.128
By contrast, individuals who contribute DNA have traditionally had no
legally recognized property interests in their genetic data.  In the well-known
property chestnut, Moore v. Regents of the University of California, researchers—
including the doctor who was treating John Moore—created and patented a
cell line using tissue from Moore’s spleen.129  Moore claimed a violation of
his genetic ownership rights, alleging that the defendants unlawfully con-
verted his cells by researching and commercializing them without his
consent.130
Despite holding that Moore might have valid claims for lack of informed
consent and/or breach of fiduciary duty, the Supreme Court of California
denied his genetic ownership claim.131  It reasoned that there could be no
conversion and, by consequence, no ability to share in the immense profits
generated by the cell line that bore his name,132 because Moore lacked a
cognizable property interest in his spleen once it left his body.133  While
damages are the typical remedy, succeeding on his conversion claim might
have also entitled Moore to replevin (i.e., recovery of the converted prop-
erty).134  He could have stopped the research and had his cells—and possibly
the resulting cell line—returned to him.  Importantly, Moore does not stand
for the proposition that the innovations made using Moore’s genetic infor-
125 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116–19
(2013).
126 See generally Conley et al., supra note 21.
127 See id. at 599.
128 See id. at 614–15.
129 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990).  For a detailed and colorful account of Moore, see
WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 36–43.
130 Moore, 793 P.2d at 480.
131 See id.
132 See Radhika Rao, Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the Human
Body?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 371, 372 (2007).
133 Moore, 793 P.2d at 488–89.
134 See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 73 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database
updated June 2017).
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mation were not property, just that Moore himself had no property rights in
that information.135
Perhaps the court in Moore did not feel compelled to recognize owner-
ship rights because Moore could potentially recover on other legal theo-
ries.136  Yet while Moore might have had breach of fiduciary duty or lack of
informed consent claims, no such legal protection exists outside of the
clinical setting.  In Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital, a group of families of
children with Canavan disease recruited a researcher to study the condition
and supplied him with biospecimens and pedigrees of themselves and several
other Canavan-affected families.137  After the researcher successfully identi-
fied the genetic variation linked to the disease, Miami Children’s Hospital
patented the isolated gene and its related applications.  The plaintiffs sued
under a number of theories, including conversion.  Citing Moore, the federal
district court dismissed their genetic ownership claim.138  However, the
Greenberg court went one step further.  It found because the plaintiffs were
donors, not patients, the researcher owed them no fiduciary duties.139  With-
out fiduciary duties, they had no claims for breach of fiduciary duty or for
lack of informed consent.140  The only claim to survive was unjust
enrichment.
Despite Moore and Greenberg, courts have appeared more open to conver-
sion claims recently.  Recall that in both Peerenboom and in Cole, claims
related to the conversion of genetic data survived motions to dismiss.141
Yet conversion claims are not the only legal actions that implicate
genetic ownership.  Although not including an explicit property claim,
another legal controversy dealing with control of genetic data occurred in
the early 2000s when members of the Havasupai tribe sued genetic research-
ers at Arizona State University (ASU) and the University of Arizona (UA) for
using their donated biological specimens to conduct research on schizophre-
nia, inbreeding, and population migration.142  The tribe made particularly
desirable research subjects because they were a relatively isolated, and there-
fore relatively genetically homogenous, population.143  While they agreed to
135 See Rao, supra note 132, at 372.
136 See Kara H. Ching, Note, Indigenous Self-Determination in an Age of Genetic Patenting:
Recognizing an Emerging Human Rights Norm, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 687, 707 (1997).
137 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1066 (S.D. Fla. 2003).  For a lively retelling of Greenberg, see WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at
193–96.
138 See Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1070–71.
139 See id. at 1071–72.
140 See id.
141 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
142 See Lori Andrews, Havasupai Tribe Sues Genetic Researchers, 31 PRIVACY J. 5, 5–6
(2005).
143 See Debra Harry, Indigenous Peoples and Gene Disputes, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147,
150–51, 182–84 (2009); LorrieAnn Santos, Genetic Research in Native Communities, 2 PRO-
GRESS COMMUNITY HEALTH PARTNERSHIPS 321, 321 (2008); see also WASHINGTON, supra note
11, at 289.
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research regarding diabetes, the litigants asserted that if they had known
about the additional research, they would not have consented.144  (Notably,
the district court that heard one of the cases dismissed the claim for lack of
informed consent.)145  However, the parties ultimately settled with ASU,
agreeing to pay $700,000, return remaining blood samples and research doc-
uments, terminate any approvals for new or ongoing research on the sam-
ples, and provide a list of all the entities that received samples.146  Although
the Havasupai did not frame their arguments in property terms, the rights
they sought—to control and to possess—fall within the property bundle.
In 2009, a genetic ownership dispute took place in Texas over 5.3 mil-
lion blood spots that the state had been collecting without parental consent
for its newborn screening program.147  Parents sued when they discovered
that the state had maintained the unconsented samples for research.148
Again while not explicitly about property, the case involved rights frequently
understood as components of the property bundle.  Clearly, the parents
wanted to control what happened to their children’s DNA, and, as part of the
settlement agreement, Texas agreed to destroy the blood spots.149
Perhaps the most familiar genetic ownership controversy is the story of
Henrietta Lacks, the source of the well-known HeLa cell line.  Lacks was a
poor, black woman with a horrific case of cervical cancer.150  In the course of
her treatment, her physicians took some of her cancerous cells and used
them to create the first immortal cell line.  Even though extracting cells with-
out the patient’s consent was acceptable by the legal and ethical standards of
the time, the descendants of Henrietta Lacks felt both she and they had been
exploited.151  Like the Havasupai and the Texas blood spot cases, the Lacks
have not asserted property claims.  However, the Lacks frequently stated that
at a minimum they should share in the profits made from HeLa cells and
144 See Andrews, supra note 142, at 5.
145 See Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ., No. 04-CV-1290, 2005 WL 6199562, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 3, 2005) (finding that (1) tribe members had agreed to having their blood drawn and
to broad use and that (2) the regulations governing human subject research lack a private
right of action).
146 See Jorge L. Contreras, Genetic Property, 105 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (2016); Katherine
Drabiak-Syed, Lessons from Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona State University Board of Regents:
Recognizing Group, Cultural, and Dignitary Harms as Legitimate Risks Warranting Integration into
Research Practice, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 175, 195 (2010); Amy Harmon, Indian Tribe
Wins Fight to Limit Research of Its DNA, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com
/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html?pagewanted=all.
147 See Contreras, supra note 146, at 21.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 21–22.
150 See generally REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010).
151 Id. at 5, 168–69.  Lacks’s daughter wrote that her mother was “[r]obbed of her cells”
and “[r]obbed [of] [s]elf.” Id. at 196.  Her husband stated, “As far as them selling my
wife’s cells without my knowledge and making a profit—I don’t like that at all.  They are
exploiting both of us.  If they’ve been making a profit they should give me some kind of
restitution.”  WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 33 (quoting Harriet Washington, Henrietta
Lacks: An Unsung Hero, EMERGE MAG., Oct. 1994, at 29).
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from the research they enable.152  They are thus articulating their perceived
right to commercialize the family’s genetic data.
In 2015, direct-to-consumer genetic testing company 23andMe
announced that it had signed the first of approximately ten multimillion-
dollar deals to sell access to its customer databases to pharmaceutical and
biotech companies.153  This agreement came as no real surprise, as commen-
tators had long predicted that the company’s true purpose was not to sell
affordable genetic tests but to collect potentially lucrative data.154  Impor-
tantly, approximately 600,000 of 23andMe’s 800,000 customers formally con-
sented to have the company share their genetic information with third
parties.155  Those individuals are therefore considered donors.156  However,
obtaining proper consent for the donations has not shielded the company
from criticism.  The company sold the data that it got for free, thus profiting
from the altruistic actions of its customers.  Furthermore, one article on the
new business venture warned consumers, “[i]f you’re paying a cut rate to
have 23andMe sequence your DNA, you are 23andMe’s product.”157  Even
more recently, 23andMe announced that it had raised $250 million dollars in
start-up money for drug development, with one article titled “23andMe
Raises Another $250 Million—and Wants to Use Your Genetic Data to Make
Drugs.”158  The specter of ownership and property again emerges here, yet
related to the right not to commercialize one’s genetic data (i.e., the desire to
donate, perhaps for altruistic reasons), as well as fears of commodification in
the form of the admonition that 23andMe’s customers are also its products.
152 See generally SKLOOT, supra note 150; WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 168, 195, 197,
223, 233, 235, 247, 267.
153 See Matthew Herper, Surprise! With $60 Million Dollar Genentech Deal, 23andMe Has a
Business Plan, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/
01/06/surprise-with-60-million-genentech-deal-23andme-has-a-business-plan/.
154 See Charles Seife, 23andMe Is Terrifying, But Not for the Reasons the FDA Thinks, SCI.
AM. (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/23andme-is-terrifying-
but-not-for-reasons-fda/; see also David P. Hamilton, 23andMe: Will the Personal-Genomics
Company Need Big Pharma to Make Money?, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 19, 2007), http://venture
beat.com/2007/11/19/23andme-will-the-personal-genomics-company-need-big-pharma-to-
make-money/.
155 See Herper, supra note 153.  According to the company, eighty percent of its cus-
tomers consent to sharing their genetic data. See Lydia Ramsey, 23andMe CEO Defends Prac-
tice of Sharing Genetic Info with Pharma Companies, YAHOO FIN. (July 7, 2015), http://
finance.yahoo.com/news/23andme-ceo-defends-practice-sharing-164857907.html.
156 See Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1071 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (explaining that for donors of biological material “the voluntary
nature of their submissions warrants different treatment” than research subjects).
157 See Sarah Zhang, Of Course 23andMe’s Plan Has Been to Sell Your Genetic Data All Along,
GIZMODO (Jan. 6, 2015), http://gizmodo.com/of-course-23andmes-business-plan-has-been-
to-sell-your-1677810999.
158 Sy Mukherjee, 23andMe Raises Another $250 Million—and Wants to Use Your Genetic
Data to Make Drugs, FORTUNE (Sept. 12, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/12/23andme-
250-million-sequoia-drugs/.
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These stories exemplify the current controversies surrounding genetic
ownership.  Despite the absence of legally recognized ownership interests in
Moore and Greenberg, individuals have continued to assert rights typically
found within the property bundle regarding both their genetic data and
their genetic material—mainly the right to control, the right to possess, the
right to destroy, the right to commercialize, and the right to give away.  The
following subsection takes a closer look at the law of genetic ownership and
its accompanying legal entitlements.
2. Genetic Ownership Entitlements
Despite the absence of widespread legally recognized property rights for
individuals in their genetic data, people seem to presume that they own their
DNA.  Recall President Obama’s intuition that a person owns her genetic
data.159  In fact, some states have explicitly recognized a person’s DNA as her
property.  To date, five states—Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Loui-
siana—have deemed genetic data the property of the person from whom it
came.160  And more states may follow suit.  Within the past six years, legisla-
tors in South Dakota, Alabama, Massachusetts, and Texas have introduced
bills that would make a person’s genetic information or DNA sample her
property.161
159 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
160 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (West 2017) (providing that both “a DNA
sample” and “the results of DNA analysis” are “the exclusive property of the person sam-
pled or analyzed”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (West 2017) (stating that
“[g]enetic information is the unique property of the individual to whom the information
pertains”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 2017) (proclaiming that the results of
DNA analysis are “the exclusive property of the person tested”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-
1(1) (West 2017) (stating that “[g]enetic information is the unique property of the individ-
ual tested”); LA. R.S. § 22:1023(E) (West 2017) (providing that in the context of insurance
“[a]n insured’s or enrollee’s genetic information is the property of the insured or
enrollee”).
161 In 2012, the South Dakota legislature introduced a bill that would designate genetic
information “the sole property of the person from whom it was derived.”  H.B. 1260, 2012
Legis. Assemb., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012), http://legis.sd.gov/docs/legsession/2012/Bills/
HB1260P.pdf.  The Alabama bill would have made genetic information “personal prop-
erty,” and the legislation proposed in both Massachusetts and Vermont would have
declared genetic information the “exclusive property” of the individual and “real property”
as a matter of law. See Jennifer K. Wagner & Dan Vorhaus, On Genetic Rights and States: A
Look at South Dakota and Around the U.S., GENOMICS L. REP. (Mar. 20, 2012), http://
www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2012/03/20/on-genetic-rights-and-states-a-look-
at-south-dakota-and-around-the-u-s/.  During Texas’s last gubernatorial election, now-Gov-
ernor Greg Abbott expressed his support for giving individuals a cognizable property inter-
est in their genetic information.  Citing Moore and the story of the Lacks family, Governor
Abbott urged the legislators to “pass legislation that clearly recognizes an individual’s prop-
erty right in his or her DNA.” See Greg Abbott, Recognize a Property Right in One’s Own DNA,
GREGABBOTT.COM (2013), http://townhall254.gregabbott.com/topic/recognize-a-prop-
erty-right-in-ones-own-dna/.  Proposed Texas bills would have given an individual “an
exclusive property right” in a sample of her DNA.  H.B. 1220, 2015 Leg., 84(R) Sess. (Tex.
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Moreover, policies from genetic testing companies also imply the exis-
tence of property rights.  23andMe’s terms of service include a “Waiver of
Property Rights,”162 thereby indicating the potential presence of ownership
interests.  Another direct-to-consumer genetic testing company, Ances-
tryDNA, explicitly acknowledges the existence of property interests, stating
that “[y]ou always maintain ownership of your DNA and DNA data”163 (with
the proviso that the individual has no rights in the research or commercial
products developed from her DNA) and granting the testing company a per-
petual, royalty-free license to use that information.164
The current law of genetic ownership is a hodgepodge of statutory, intel-
lectual property, tort, and contract law, as well as research regulations.  As
such, before developing a theory of genetic ownership, we must resolve
which property rights comprise the genetic ownership bundle.  While there
are some clear legal rules, genetic ownership rights are also being implied
from other doctrines and negotiated ad hoc.
As a legal matter, property is frequently thought of as a set of indepen-
dent entitlements, or more colloquially, as a “bundle of sticks.”165  Thus, any
meaningful discussion of genetic ownership requires outlining the entitle-
ments at stake.  Patent holders have clearly defined genetic ownership rights.
In particular, they have the right to prevent others from making, using, or
selling the patented innovation over the course of the patent term.  Owners
of proprietary databases can likewise restrict access and use.  However, per-
sonal genetic ownership rights are much less clearly defined.  With respect to
a person’s rights in her DNA, this Article identifies three limited property
entitlements that make up the personal genetic ownership bundle: (1) a
right to exclude, (2) a right to access, and (3) a right to commercialize.
2015); H.B. 3582, 2015 Leg., 84(R) Sess. (Tex. 2015); S.B. 475, 2015 Leg., 84(R) Sess. (Tex.
2015).
162 Terms of Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/ (last visited Jan.
18, 2018).
163 Privacy Statement, ANCESTRY, http://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement#
Intro (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
164 See Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/legal/us/
termsAndConditions#Term3 (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
165 See, e.g., HENRY SIDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 66 (1891) (identifying three inter-
ests in the property bundle: the right to exclusive use, the right to destroy, and the right to
alienate); Anthony M. Honore´, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112–28
(A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (describing eleven “standard incidents of ownership”: the right to
possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to income from the object of
ownership, the right to capital (including the right to alienate, as well as the rights “to
consume, waste, or destroy”), the right to security over time, the right of transmissibility,
the absence of term, the duty to avoid harm, the liability for the execution of debts, and
residuarity (meaning that when limited interests expire, such as those of a lessee, the prop-
erty interest reverts back to the owner)); see also ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 4.
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a. Right to Exclude
Individuals enjoy a limited right to exclude pertaining to their genetic
data.  Take the doctrine of informed consent, which applies both to treat-
ment and to research.  Physicians must disclose their research interests when
treating patients.166  Outside the treatment relationship, the Common Rule
requires consent for human subject research, including research on identifi-
able biospecimens.167  Internationally, the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity gives states rights concerning access to their “genetic resources” and
provides that any access to those resources must be done with informed
consent.168
In a recent article, Jorge Contreras argued that informed consent cre-
ates a de facto property regime for genetic data.  According to Contreras,
requiring consent for genetic research mimics Blackstonian property by giv-
ing potential research subjects a right to exclude, a right to destroy, an ability
to consent to some studies but not others (i.e., divisibility), deadhand con-
trol, and a right to alienate with respect to their genetic data.169  As evidence
of this property-like control, Contreras describes the Texas blood spot con-
troversy170 and the case of the Havasupai,171 as those disputes ended with the
research being stopped and the samples being either destroyed or returned.
It is worth noting, however, that despite superficial similarities, informed
consent differs from property in at least one significant way: remedies.  To be
sure, not all property interests are protected by “property rules.”172  How-
ever, while a plaintiff who succeeds in a claim for conversion may be entitled
to the return of her property, an action for informed consent can only result
in damages.173  The destruction of the blood spots in Texas and the return of
the Havasupai’s samples were the result of settlement agreements, not court
ordered relief.  Had the litigants gone to trial, the only available remedy
would have been monetary.  Thus, the rights to exclude and destroy exer-
cised in those cases were products of contract law (settlement) rather than
informed consent.  Although litigants have successfully halted research on
their genetic data through settlement negotiations, once valid consent is
obtained, the sources of genetic material have little say in what happens to
166 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 506 (Cal. 1990); see also
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS
§ 2.08 (2008–2009 ed.).
167 See General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2014).
168 Convention on Biological Diversity art. 15, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
169 Contreras, supra note 146, at 20–37.
170 Id. at 21–22.
171 Id. at 22–23.
172 Property rules require voluntary transactions between buyers and sellers. See Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
173 See BETH HOLLIDAY, 49 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 573 (2011) (describing the remedies
for informed consent, which consist only of damages).
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their tissues and data.174  Hence, an informed consent–based right to
exclude is limited.
Beyond informed consent, Peerenboom and Cole, described in the Intro-
duction, could demonstrate a newfound willingness of courts to recognize an
individual’s right to exclude with respect to genetic information.  Both cases
reference the property tort of conversion—the very claim rejected by the
Moore and Greenberg courts—as the basis for legal protection.  The right to
exclude is at the very heart of actions for conversion.  As a result, the out-
comes of these cases could result in more robust common law (conversion)
and statutory (Alaska’s Privacy Act) rights to exclude.
The Lacks family also arguably negotiated a right to exclude with NIH
regarding the distribution of the HeLa genome.  Pursuant to an agreement
between the family and the agency, two members of the Lacks family serve on
the board that determines whether to grant research access to the HeLa gen-
ome and any publications resulting from that research will acknowledge the
Lacks family.175  Thus, the Lacks now enjoy a limited right to exclude with
respect to the HeLa genome.
b. Right to Access
Individuals also enjoy genetic access rights.  Recent amendments to the
governing regulations for HIPAA and the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments (CLIA) grant a right to access.  Previously, CLIA labs were
legally unable to provide individuals with direct access to the results of their
lab tests in some states.176  Following the amendments, patients and subjects
participating in research conducted by covered entities can now indepen-
dently access their results pursuant to HIPAA’s Privacy Rule.177  The latest
complaint against Myriad asserts that HIPAA gives individuals unfettered
access to their genetic information regardless of purpose.178  Moreover, this
right is exclusive.  Only the individual herself or the people and institutions
involved in the testing can access the results.  Everyone else needs
permission.
174 See Jennifer Kulynych & Henry T. Greely, Clinical Genomics, Big Data, and Electronic
Medical Records: Reconciling Patient Rights with Research when Privacy and Science Collide, 4 J.L.
& BIOSCIENCES 94, 98 (2017).
175 See Ram, supra note 14, at 875.
176 CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 79 Fed.
Reg. 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164 (2014)) (stat-
ing that “[i]n states that do not allow individuals to access their own test results, the indi-
viduals must receive their test results through their health care providers”).
177 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1), (a)(2)(iv).
178 See Health Information Privacy Complaint, supra note 17, at 5 (“Patients have a right
to access their genetic information, regardless of the purpose for which they seek it, under
the HIPAA Privacy Rule.”).
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c. Right to Commercialize
Lastly, individuals are finding ways to commercialize their genetic data.
Sharon and Patrick Terry formed the research advocacy organization, PXE
International, after their two children were diagnosed with pseudoxanthoma
elasticum (PXE) in 1994.179  Unlike the Greenberg plaintiffs, before the Terrys
approached researchers with the extensive blood and tissue banks they had
amassed, they incorporated themselves.180  They consented to offering access
to this valuable resource only if researchers agreed to share their profits.181
Thus, the Terrys used contract law to negotiate their genetic ownership
interests.182
Several genetic testing companies are considering offering their clients
commercial interests.  As of 2016, genetic testing company Genos will com-
pensate customers for sharing their genomic data with researchers, describ-
ing themselves as “an app store for data.”183  The executive chairman
explains: “The model is that you own your genome. . . . When a researcher is
paying to access a genome, they are not paying us directly, they are paying
the individual, and we are taking a percentage in order to maintain a secure
website.”184  Similarly, the CEO of the genetic testing company Invitae indi-
cated that once it accumulated a large enough consumer database, it would
sell access to third parties, allowing the contributors of DNA to share in the
resulting revenues.185  Likewise, DNAsimple pays people $50 for an initial
saliva sample and another $50 for additional samples.186
The updates to the Common Rule may give individuals even more
opportunities to bargain for commercial interests in their genetic data.  One
change requires researchers, as part of the informed consent process, to tell
research subjects whether the research from their biospecimens will be used
for commercial purposes and if they will share in the resulting profits.187
179 Rao, supra note 132, at 375.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 See id.  The relationship between property and contract law is often underap-
preciated.  To start, people frequently contract for ownership rights.  After all, leases and
title agreements are contracts.  In the context of genetic ownership, Russell Korobkin has
argued that legal scholars have misconstrued Moore as a property law case when it is better
understood as a contract law case articulating a “no compensation” default rule for
donated tissues. See Russell Korobkin, “No Compensation” or “Pro Compensation”: Moore v.
Regents and Default Rules for Human Tissue Donations, 40 J. HEALTH L. 1 (2007).
183 Julia Karow, Consumer Genomics Startup Genos Research Plans to Let Customers Explore,
Share Their Data, GENOMEWEB (June 13, 2016), https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-
diagnostics/consumer-genomics-startup-genos-research-plans-let-customers-explore-share.
184 Id.
185 See Alex Lash, What’s Your DNA Worth? The Scramble to Cash in on the Genome, XCO-
NOMY (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.xconomy.com/national/2015/10/20/whats-your-dna-
worth-the-scramble-to-cash-in-on-the-genome/.
186 Daley & Cranley, supra note 16.
187 See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7266 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
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People might not be aware there was the opportunity for commercial gain in
the first place.  Thus, the new disclosure requirements could inform people
who are currently unaware that their biospecimens have potential commer-
cial value, thereby giving them the opportunity to negotiate a profit-sharing
arrangement.188
* * *
Two exciting conversations about property are currently taking place.
First, progressive property scholars are challenging the hegemony of neoclas-
sical law and economics as property’s dominant theoretical lens.  Second,
bioethicists are grappling with the implications of granting entitlements in
genetic data.  This Article seeks to combine these dialogues to test whether
progressive property would provide a useful lens for understanding genetic
ownership and, in so doing, prove this new school of thought’s utility beyond
land use.  Interestingly enough, as with real property, current genetic owner-
ship debates have also been entrenched in neoclassical economic theory.
II. HEGEMONY OF NEOCLASSICAL LAW AND ECONOMICS IN
GENETIC OWNERSHIP
The debates surrounding genetic ownership described in Part I deal
with the extent to which individuals, researchers, and biotech companies
should be able to exercise their respective entitlements.  As with physical
property, discussions of actual, implied, or potential genetic ownership rights
have been steeped in the language of neoclassical economic theory.  Adopt-
ing a familiar trope within property theory, this Article classifies genetic own-
ership debates as either comedies or tragedies.189  It uses the terms “comedy”
and “tragedy” broadly to mean whether a given entitlement will lead to either
positive or undesirable consequences.  Yet comedic or tragic, many debates
surrounding genetic ownership are framed in terms of incentives, efficiency,
costs, benefits, and market value.  Through these discussions, Part II estab-
lishes that the dominance of neoclassical economic theory in property law is
not confined to land but rather is also the central narrative in the legal and
theoretical discussions surrounding the ownership of genetic data.
A. Genetic Comedies
One reaction to the genetic ownership rights described in Part I regards
this trend as creating positive incentives for researchers, biotech companies,
188 Jessica L. Roberts, Negotiating Commercial Interests in Biospecimens, 45 J.L. MED. & ETH-
ICS 138, 140 (2017).
189 Interestingly, literature equates “tragedy” with “inefficiency.”  The paradigmatic
property tragedy of course is the tragedy of the commons: the theory that too much public
ownership leads to overuse. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 723 (1986) (defining comedic “in the classical sense of a
story with a happy outcome”).
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or individuals.  These viewpoints are genetic comedies—arguments in favor
of recognizing entitlements in genetic data—in that they tell an optimistic
story that genetic ownership rights maximize the value of genetic informa-
tion.  They also fit methodically into the neoclassical economic tradition,
since they are based on rational choice theory and use cost-benefit analysis as
their major analytical tool.  As these arguments go, genetic ownership rights
create incentives for rational actors to engage in value-generating genetic
research, making genetic ownership desirable.
1. Research Incentives
The very nature of intellectual property is incentive-based.  The Patent
and Copyright Clause states that the purpose of intellectual property is “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries.”190  This goal is decidedly utilitarian on its face: the law
recognizes IP interests to maximize creative output.191
The reasoning goes that, because information is nonrivalrous and
nonexcludable, rational actors will not innovate out of concern for free rid-
ers.192  A rational actor would not invest valuable time, energy, or resources
in developing something that another person could use for free.  Without an
exclusive right, the researcher or the company might simply not innovate at
all or might attempt to keep the work secret to preserve their market
share.193  Giving innovators exclusive rights in their intellectual property
generates a financial incentive to create.  Thus, a patent can be understood
as a bargain: the inventor trades disclosure for a temporary monopoly.  (Of
course, entities may no longer patent isolated genes.  However, other kinds
of innovations related to genetic data remain patentable.)  As with patents,
proprietary interests in genetic databases incentivize companies to assemble
and share valuable genetic information.194  Here genetic ownership entitle-
ments are the agents of good by encouraging researchers and companies to
190 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
191 See Sunder, supra note 80, at 283.
192 See Henry E. Smith, Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for Technological Inno-
vation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1057, 1076 (2013); see also WASHINGTON, supra note 11,
at 18; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimen-
tal Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–28 (1989); Mark A. Hall, Property, Privacy, and the
Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic Medical Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631, 653 (2010); Ching,
supra note 136, at 695–96.
193 See Eisenberg, supra note 192, at 1028–30; Ching, supra note 136, at 695–96.
194 Of course, by assuming that legally recognized property interests are necessary for
facilitating development and investment, IP seems to reject the notion of creation for crea-
tion’s sake.  As Sunder has observed, “market failure is cited as the raison d’eˆtre for intellec-
tual property, explaining copyright, patent, and even trademark.”  Sunder, supra note 80,
at 283.  She explains that this orientation results in several familiar attributes of the law and
economics frame, including dependence on the market for distributive purposes, use of
willingness to pay to determine access, and limited government intervention in addressing
market failures. Id.
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invest and innovate.  In fact, the neoclassical economic view of the patent
system is so well-accepted that even progressive property theorists have
embraced welfarism in the context of patents.195
2. Participation Incentives
Some advocates of genetic ownership rights for individuals have adopted
a similarly neoclassical economic approach.  The raw materials for human
genetic and genomic research must inevitably come from people.  While not
as clearly tied to market value as patents, encouraging people to participate
in research is framed as welfare-enhancing.  The mission statement of the
Precision Medicine Initiative emphasizes the importance of individuals work-
ing with researchers to improve health care.196
Studies indicate that trust in both researchers and in their institutions is
a necessary prerequisite for participating in research.197  Relatedly, mount-
ing evidence shows that people expect to be told—and to maintain some
measure of control over—how researchers use their genetic data.198  Distrust
could undermine research if people are unwilling to share their genetic data
because they are wary of potential exploitation.199
The subjects of genetic ownership controversies, like John Moore,200 the
Greenberg plaintiffs,201 and the Havasupai, have all expressed feelings of dis-
195 See Alexander, supra note 42, at 1026 (“In yet other domains (Dagan gives the exam-
ple of patents), utilitarian welfare maximization is and should be the dominant value.”).
196 See So What Is Precision Medicine?, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/preci-
sion-medicine (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
197 See Mark A. Rothstein et al., Citizen Science on Your Smartphone: An ELSI Research
Agenda, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 897, 900 (2015).
198 See Kulynych & Greely, supra note 174, at 125–26 (discussing patient expectations
and possible reactions to learning genetic data has been studied without consent).
199 See Harald Schmidt & Shawneequa Callier, How Anonymous Is ‘Anonymous’? Some Sug-
gestions Towards a Coherent Universal Coding System for Genetic Samples, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 304,
304, 308 (2012).
200 Moore stated: “How does it feel to be patented?  There was a sense of betrayal.  I
mean, they owned a part of me that I could never recover.  I certainly have no objection to
scientific research . . . but it was like a rape.  In a sense you’ve been violated, for dollars.
My genetic essence held captive.” WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 11 (omission in original);
see also Peter Carlson, A Seattle Man Vents His Spleen Against Those Who Would Use It for Profit,
PEOPLE (Sept. 23, 1985), http://people.com/archive/a-seattle-man-vents-his-spleen-
against-those-who-would-use-it-for-profit-vol-23-no-13/; Dennis McLellan, John Moore, 56;
Sued to Share Profits from His Cells, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/
2001/oct/13/local/me-56770.
201 One parent said, “We were shocked. . . . This is a desecration of all the good that
came out of Jonathan and Amy’s lives.  We gave our DNA and that of our children to help
develop testing and prenatal diagnosis.  We sent our blood and skin samples to a doctor at
Miami Children’s Hospital.” WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 195 (quoting Dan Green-
berg).  Another asked, “Is it right that they use our genes—given to help others—in a way
that restricts access and increases cost to testing?” Id. (quoting Judith Tsipis).
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trust and exploitation.202  These high-profile stories of perceived exploita-
tion could chill participation in biomedical research.  The more widely
publicized the feelings of exploitation, the greater their potential impact.  If
concerns about a distrust contagion seem overblown, consider that Oprah
Winfrey starred in a heavily promoted HBO original feature about Lacks,
released in early 2017.203
Current strategies to improve research participation assume people are
rational actors weighing costs and benefits.204  Studies speculate that individ-
uals will not participate in research when the potential benefits are unclear
and the potential costs are too high.205  On the benefit side, a person might
consider how her actions could help her family members, members of her
communities, and the public at large.206  On the cost side, she might con-
sider the ways in which research could lead to stigma or disadvantage.207
The cost side of the equation tends to be higher for certain populations—
like people of color—that have experienced past discrimination and
exploitation.208
A neoclassical economic solution to low rates of research participation
would be to offer some kind of an exclusive right in one’s own genetic data to
tip the scales in favor of participation.  Not surprisingly, several scholars have
argued in favor of increased genetic ownership rights to encourage people to
participate in research.  Although she would not frame the entitlements she
proposes in ownership terms, Barbara Evans fears that without adequate
access to or control over their information, instead of participating in
202 The Havasupai also reported feeling taken advantage of, explaining that their dis-
trust now affects the willingness of some tribe members to seek medical care, let alone to
participate in research. See Jana Bommersbach, Arizona’s Broken Arrow: Did Arizona State
University Genetically Rape the Havasupai Tribe?, PHX. MAG., Nov. 2008, at 134; Rob Capric-
cioso, Havasupai Blood Case Lives On, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Jan. 2,
2009), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/havasupai-blood-case-lives-on/;
Drabiak-Syed, supra note 146, at 212; Howard Fischer, Havasupai Blood Lawsuit Reinstated,
ARIZ. DAILY SUN (Nov. 28, 2008), http://azdailysun.com/news/havasupai-blood-lawsuit-
reinstated/html; Harmon, supra note 146; Paul Rubin, Indian Givers, PHX. NEW TIMES (May
27, 2004), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/indian-givers-6428347.  When asked
what she would tell the President of ASU or Board of Regents, one member of the tribe
told a reporter she would say, “You’ve hurt us so bad that we feel like we don’t trust anyone
anymore. We don’t want anything to do with the university anymore. We hate you all.”
Bommersbach, supra, at 134 (quoting Aral Putesoy Kaska).
203 See The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt5686132/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
204 See A.J. Goldenberg et al., Patient Perspectives on Group Benefits and Harms in Genetic
Research, 14 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 135, 139 (2010).
205 See WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 203.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See Mark A. Rothstein, Ethical Issues in Big Data Health Research: Currents in Contempo-
rary Bioethics, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 427 (2015).
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research, people will “take their data and go home.”209  Mark Hall and Kevin
Schulman propose offering people the opportunity to negotiate revocable or
term-limited licenses for accessing their health data information to
encourage data sharing.210  Independently of Schulman, Hall adopts the lens
of network economics to argue for allowing patients to assign interests in
their health data to a trusted third party that will commercialize them accord-
ing to “their value and best use.”211  Patient advocacy groups have also
argued in favor of increased ownership rights.  One such group, UnPatient,
characterizes health data as a form of “surplus resource” that is not generat-
ing value absent personal ownership rights.212  The leaders of UnPatient
believe ownership rights will create an incentive to share data to maximize its
value.213
And finally, the commercial interests being offered by genetic testing
companies are also incentives to encourage people to participate in
research.214  By compensating its customers for sharing their data, the chair-
man of Genos aspires to build a large customer database and to profit by
connecting them with researchers.215  The CEO of Invitae hopes that reve-
nue sharing will encourage people to stay on his platform over the competi-
tion, explaining “If you go to a social networking site, and every time an
advertiser was pinging you the network made money and you also got a piece
of the action, would you still stay in a network where they’re taking your
private information and making money off you?”216  DNAsimple’s CEO
explains that people are more willing to participate in research because they
“feel [like] part of the process when they get compensated.”217
The happy ending produced from this genetic comedy is a world where
researchers, biotech, and society at large benefit from scientific advances
while the individuals who provide the genetic information get the benefit of
being compensated for their willingness to participate in research.  In short,
everyone wins.
209 Barbara J. Evans, Barbarians at the Gate: Consumer-Driven Health Data Commons and the
Transformation of Citizen Science, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 651, 658 (2016).
210 See Mark A. Hall & Kevin A. Schulman, Ownership of Medical Information, 301 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1282, 1284 (2009).
211 Hall, supra note 192, at 631.
212 Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, Commentary, Unpatients—Why Patients Should Own
Their Medical Data, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 921, 923 (2015).
213 See id.
214 I have also joined the conversation about the kinds of incentives these interests
might create. See Jessica L. Roberts et al., Correspondence, Should You Profit from Your
Genome?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 18, 18 (2017).
215 See Karow, supra note 183.
216 Lash, supra note 185.
217 Daley & Cranley, supra note 16.
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B. Genetic Tragedies
Entitlements in genetic data could lead to tragedies—socially costly out-
comes—as well.  These arguments also adopt a neoclassical law and econom-
ics frame: they presuppose that people are rational actors who respond to
incentives, but suggest that “propertizing” genetic data will lead to inefficient
or other kinds of undesirable outcomes.
1. Anticommons
A tragedy of the anticommons is probably the most familiar property
tragedy invoked in bioethics.  Turning the infamous tragedy of the commons
on its head, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg famously argued that too
much private ownership leads to underuse.  While this problem can occur in
a variety of settings,218 in the context of biomedical research, they argued
that patents lead to underuse by creating overlapping property rights.219
Separately, Heller asserts that patents changed the culture of biomedical
research, shifting it from a commons to an anticommons.220
Imagine, for example, that numerous different entities own patents on a
cell line itself, the cDNA of the cell line’s genome, and various processes and
applications related to the cell line.  If a particular line of research requires
all owners to consent to licensing, any one owner could undermine the pro-
ject by withholding her permission, thereby creating the opportunity for stra-
tegic holdouts.221  The costs of coordinating all of these ownership interests
drive up the price of the end product, an expense that ultimately gets passed
down to the consumers in an already largely unaffordable health-care sys-
tem.222  Sometimes the coordination costs will be so high that they will far
exceed what the innovation would be worth on the market.223  A researcher
may then decide to abandon a particular project because obtaining all the
necessary permissions is too costly or time-consuming.  If such issues become
systemic, members of the biotech industry may opt to move away from genet-
ics and genomics entirely.224  These holdout and coordination problems
218 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 3–4 (2010).
219 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998); see also WASHINGTON, supra
note 11, at 120; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290–91 (2003).
220 HELLER, supra note 218, at 58; WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 5.
221 See D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 1183, 1199 (2013).
222 WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 5, 127.
223 See HELLER, supra note 218, at 5; WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 126.
224 See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 763, 767 (2002); Sapna Kumar, Standing Against Bad Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 12); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents
Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 577, 592 (1999).
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demonstrate how several concurrent ownership interests could create an
anticommons or what Heller has recently called “gridlock.”225
Anticommons or gridlock in the context of biomedical research has seri-
ous consequences.  Companies lose profits but more importantly people can-
not access needed medical care, get sick, and die.  Heller calls the medical
innovations thwarted by anticommons “a silent tragedy.”226  However, the
extent to which an anticommons is harmful is hard to measure and even
harder to address.  Heller asks: “Where do you go to complain about lifesav-
ing drugs that could exist—should exist—but don’t?”227  He asserts that the
solution to gridlock is to grant the least amount of ownership possible that
will preserve the patent system’s incentives for investment and innovation.
Anticommons result from the undesirable cumulative effects of individ-
ual rational choices.228  The holdouts who ultimately undermine research
are simply rational actors responding to the incentives created by the patent
system.  Heller calls gridlock “a free market paradox.”229  Thus, despite its
potential life-and-death impacts, anticommons is, at its core, an argument
about inefficient use.
The traditional anticommons arguments have been aimed at physical
property and patents, including biopatents.  However, arguments against giv-
ing individuals property rights in their genetic information can also be
understood in anticommons terms.  Some argue that individuals should not
own their genetic data because they could use those rights to chill
research.230  While a researcher might need some incentive to study it and a
biotech company might need some incentive to commercialize it, I don’t
need an incentive to create my genetic data.231  As evinced in Moore and
Greenberg, courts have been reluctant to recognize common-law property
interests in DNA out of a concern that people might exercise those rights in a
way that would chill research.  In these scenarios, the holdouts creating
gridlock would not be biotech companies extracting value from their patents,
but individual people extracting value from their genetic data.
In Moore, the biotech industry spoke out in response to the lawsuit, argu-
ing that recognizing an individual’s property rights in her cells would under-
mine scientific research.232  In dismissing the conversion claim, the Supreme
Court of California framed its decision in terms of costs and incentives.  It
opined that “[t]he extension of conversion law into this area will hinder
225 HELLER, supra note 218, at xiv.
226 Id. at 6.
227 Id.; see also id. at 78.
228 Id. at 196 (explaining that tragedies of the commons and anticommons occur when
“individual rational choices add up to collective misery”).
229 Id. at xiv.
230 See Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Tech-
nology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1225 (1969); Spinello, supra
note 112, at 29.
231 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 1148.
232 WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 42.
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research by restricting access to the necessary raw materials.”233  The court
feared that because “conversion is predicated on a continuing ownership
interest,” those claims could undermine research incentives and deter invest-
ment by creating an opportunity for holdouts that result in underuse.234  It
concluded that recognizing property interests in excised cells “would not fur-
ther the public interest.”235  Put differently, it would not maximize welfare.
Like the Supreme Court of California, the Southern District of Florida
in Greenberg also referenced concerns about impeding research.  The court
found that recognizing a property right for the families in Greenberg would
“cripple medical research.”236  It explained that “this extra duty would give
rise to a type of dead-hand control that research subjects could hold because
they would be able to dictate how medical research progresses.”237  Interest-
ingly, even the Northern District of Illinois, when finding it lacked personal
jurisdiction and transferring the case, wrote in terms of costs and incentives,
explaining that such claims “would put an undue burden and potentially
‘creat[e] disincentives to the conduct of socially beneficial research’ to hold
that researchers must bear the cost of potentially litigating claims by unhappy
donors in every jurisdiction from which they have received samples.”238
2. Collective Action Problems
Genetic databases could lead to another type of tragedy: collective action
problems.239  A collective action problem occurs when a group as a whole
would benefit from cooperation, yet individual members have disincentives
to act in furtherance of that goal.240  Here too, individual rational actions
rooted in cost-benefit analysis lead to widespread inefficiency and underuse.
Some people, like John Moore, have uniquely and individually valuable
biospecimens.  However, most genetic data is only valuable in the aggregate,
like Myriad’s database.  The value of a database depends on the agreement of
multiple people to share their genetic data.  A neoclassical economic view
would assert that individuals would not contribute their genetic data if the
costs of contributing outweighed the benefits of contributing.  Some scholars
233 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990).
234 Id. at 496.
235 Id. (quoting Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988)).
236 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1076 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
237 Id. at 1071.
238 Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918, 927
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Moore, 793 P.2d at 494).
239 Some have instead framed this as an anticommons issue, arguing that compiling a
database is akin to acquiring several parcels of land for development, thereby opening the
door for holdouts. See Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy and the Public Interest,
36 AM. J.L. & MED. 586, 589 (2010).  However, because the relative value of the remaining
parcels does not increase with each transaction, what Rodwin describes looks more like a
collective action problem than a holdout problem.
240 Collective Action Problem, CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS (Iain McLean &
Alistair McMillan eds., 3d ed. 2009).
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fear that because the costs are individual and the benefits are diffuse, rational
actors will not share genetic data.
Jane Bambauer argues against giving people property rights in their
data—genetic and otherwise—for these very reasons.  She asserts that
rational actors would remove their data from the collective pool to avoid
even small amounts of potential privacy risk, thereby decreasing the data’s
research value.241  Allowing people to opt out creates the potential for selec-
tion bias: as people choose not to participate due to these features, the data
ceases to reflect the general population, thus reducing its reliability.242
Bambauer thus fears that property rights in personal data “would allow hold-
outs to wreak disproportional havoc on research.”243
Marc Rodwin also argues that private ownership could thwart the crea-
tion of databases.244  Yet he does not advocate avoiding property altogether
but rather instituting public data ownership.  Rodwin would require private
entities to report anonymous, “de-identified” data to public authorities,
which in turn would aggregate that data and make it available in public
databases that private entities could access for research.245  He believes that
this arrangement would facilitate beneficial uses of health data in both the
public and private sectors, avoiding collective action problems.246
3. Perverse Incentives
Perverse incentives constitute a third type of genetic tragedy.  A perverse
incentive creates unintended undesirable results that run contrary to the pur-
pose for which the incentive was created in the first place.247  Thus, rational
actors respond to the incentive but not in the intended way. Arguments
about perverse incentives tend to focus on researchers and members of the
biotech industry, assuming—often rightly—that they behave like wealth-max-
imizing rational actors.
Specifically, critics fear that patents may have the opposite of their
desired effect discussed above.  Instead of encouraging disclosure and spur-
ring innovation, they may actually promote secrecy and hinder progress.248
Advances in research could make a patent less valuable by introducing a com-
241 See Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2011).
242 Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 95–96
(2011); Rodwin, supra note 239, at 598; Yakowitz, supra note 241, at 64–65; see also Roth-
stein, supra note 208, at 428 (describing consent bias).
243 Yakowitz, supra note 241, at 64–65.  While invoking the language of holdouts, she
describes more of a collective action problem than an anticommons problem.
244 See Rodwin, supra note 239, at 589.
245 Id.
246 See Rodwin, supra note 239, at 590; Mark A. Rodwin, The Case for Public Ownership of
Patient Data, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 86, 87 (2009).
247 For example, when the French colonial government in Hanoi decided to place a
bounty on rat tails to get villagers to exterminate the vermin, the villagers began to farm
rats. See Michael G. Vann, Of Rats, Rice, and Race: The Great Hanoi Rat Massacre, An Episode
in French Colonial History, 4 FRENCH COLONIAL HIST. 191, 196 (2003).
248 See Eisenberg, supra note 192, at 1028–29.
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petitor to the market or by making a previous innovation obsolete.249  A pat-
ent holder might then refuse to offer a license, regardless of the asking price,
for fear that the entity requesting the license may discover a flaw or short-
coming in the patent holder’s own research.250  Thus, as wealth-maximizing
rational actors, patent holders have good reasons for withholding licenses to
preserve the value of their patents, even if their actions stall innovation.  Par-
adoxically then, patents could actually decrease competition and stifle the
scientific progress they are intended to promote.251  This possibility is partic-
ularly troubling in the context of biomedical research where advances are
not simply building a better mousetrap but creating a more accurate diagnos-
tic test.  Unfortunately, these damaging kinds of restricted uses go largely
unchallenged.252
Myriad gained notoriety for taking aggressive actions to preserve its
monopoly in the market for breast and ovarian cancer genetic testing.  It
restrictively enforced its patents to shut down cancer research,253 stalling
advances in cancer science in the United States.254  It is no surprise, then,
that the first legal challenge against Myriad in 2009 garnered significant sup-
port from the research community.255  And, in a letter in support of the most
recent complaint against Myriad, the Executive Director of Breast Cancer
Action wrote that her organization is “deeply concerned about the ways that
the patent monopoly held by Myriad Genetics for nearly 20 years impeded
scientific and medical progress.”256
While Myriad successfully used its patents to chill research, it is worth
emphasizing that its conduct is not an example of an anticommons.
Gridlock happens when several overlapping ownership interests create coor-
dination issues, not when a single patent holder strategically exercises its
249 In the short term, patents may encourage secrecy, as innovations must be novel to
be patentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).  However, what concerns most commenta-
tors is longer term behavior. See Eisenberg, supra note 192, at 1029.
250 WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 184 (quoting Lori Andrews).
251 Id. at 188.
252 Generally, members of the public lack the standing to challenge patents, even when
those patents cause them clear harm. See generally Kumar, supra note 224.  For other argu-
ments that patents should consider third-party harms, see Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as
Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 96–98 (2012); Amelia Smith Rinehart, Patent Cases
and Public Controversies, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 361 (2013).
253 WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 190.
254 While Myriad was effectively limiting research in the United States, scientists in
France discovered new mutations and genetic variations linked to breast and ovarian can-
cers that Myriad’s test failed to detect. Id. at 185.  They concluded that Myriad’s test
missed between ten and twenty percent of the relevant genetic attributes. Id.
255 Researchers feared that, should Myriad win, the company’s patent monopoly would
“lead to a loss of expertise and information among physicians and research scientists in
Europe, as they will no longer be allowed to improve diagnostic technologies and meth-
ods.” Id. at 190.  One commentator, an oncology professor in Sweden, went as far as to call
Myriad’s gene patents “dangerous.” Id. at 185 (quoting Ha˚kan Olsson, M.D.).
256 Health Information Privacy Complaint, supra note 17, at Exhibit 8.
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rights.257  Perverse incentives do not lead to underuse but rather improper
or undesirable use.
Of course, Myriad’s actions eventually backfired when a lawsuit against
the company reached the Supreme Court in 2013.  In his majority opinion
invalidating patents on isolated genes, Justice Thomas alluded to perverse
incentives.  He adopted the language of incentives, explaining that “patent
protection strikes a delicate balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to
creation, invention, and discovery’ and ‘imped[ing] the flow of information
that might permit, indeed spur, invention.’”258  According to the Court,
products of nature are not patentable subject matter because “without this
exception, there would be considerable danger that the grant of patents
would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby ‘inhibit future innovation
premised upon them.’  This would be at odds with the very point of patents,
which exist to promote creation.”259  Even the Supreme Court has adopted a
neoclassical economic approach to these issues.
Furthermore, changes to the patent system within the last four decades
have arguably created perverse incentives regarding what to study.  In 1980,
Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, which encouraged academic and other
institutions doing federally funded research to patent and commercialize
their findings.260  While universities held less than three hundred patents
before the Act, they now obtain roughly three thousand per year.261  Some
believe that Bayh-Dole and a focus on profits have shifted the norms and
priorities for scientific research.262  In particular, patents have created the
incentive to focus primarily—perhaps even exclusively—on research that can
be lucratively commercialized.  This new focus has arguably created two
related perverse incentives: (1) research, no matter how socially beneficial,
may never be done if there is no market, and (2) choices between projects
will be made based on profitability.  These well-founded fears, of course,
assume that researchers and biotech are rationally considering costs and ben-
efits in an effort to extract as much market value from their research as
possible.
Assuming they are rational actors, researchers would be reluctant to
invest time and resources when no market exists for the resulting innova-
tions.  This intuition seems correct as medical issues that disproportionately
affect poor people—both in the United States and abroad—do not receive as
much scientific attention, arguably because the affected populations will not
257 See HELLER, supra note 218, at 76–77.
258 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)
(alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 92 (2012)).
259 Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86).
260 See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012)).
261 See id.; HELLER, supra note 218, at 58.
262 See WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 5, 16.
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be able to afford the resulting vaccines, medications, and other
treatments.263
Likewise, there are also concerns that, when deciding what research to
pursue, patents create incentives to select the research that will generate the
greatest revenue with the least costs.  When trying to maximize wealth, a
rational researcher might abandon a study, regardless of its medical poten-
tial, if the results will not be profitable enough.264  Within a neoclassical law
and economics framework, profitability determines priority.  Madhavi Sun-
der explains that this view “leads to the mistake that drugs for baldness are
more important than drugs for malaria because the former enjoys a multi-
billion dollar market, while those who need the latter are too poor to offer
much to save their own lives.”265
The case of guevedoce babies provides a particularly useful hypothetical.
In a small, isolated population in the Dominican Republic, approximately
two percent of the births during the 1970s resulted in children who were
physiologically female when born but who developed male sex characteris-
tics, including penises and testicles, during puberty.266  Research on these
individuals led to the development of drugs that could treat both male pat-
tern baldness and prostate cancer.267  The research on guevedoces raises a
provocative question: What use should be the focus?268  Suppose that
100,000 people will pay $1000 each for the baldness treatment but that the
cancer drug would only save 100 lives and none of the affected individuals
have health insurance or the ability to afford treatment because they are part
of a cancer cluster made up exclusively of low-income workers.269  The bald-
ness research therefore has a market value of $100,000,000 and the cancer
research has no market value.  If the researchers in the hypothetical are
wealth-maximizing rational actors, they will focus on the baldness research.
* * *
Perhaps unwittingly, commentators on all sides of the genetic ownership
debate have adopted a neoclassical economic frame.  Despite the diversity of
stakeholders and interests, commentators across the spectrum articulate their
263 See id. at 4.
264 See id.
265 Sunder, supra note 80, at 284.
266 See Julianne Imperato-McGinley et al., Androgens and the Evolution of Male-Gender
Identity Among Male Pseudohermaphrodites with 5a´-Reductase Deficiency, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1233, 1233–37 (1979); see also Andrew Siegel, The Guevedoces: How an Intersex Genetic Defect
Led to a Blockbuster Class of Medicines, OUR GREATEST WEALTH IS HEALTH BLOG (Feb. 18,
2012, 8:38 AM), https://healthdoc13.wordpress.com/2012/02/18/the-guevedoces-how-
an-intersex-genetic-defect-led-to-a-blockbuster-class-of-medicines/.
267 See Siegel, supra note 266.
268 While the same class of drugs resulting from research on guevedoces could treat
both conditions, it is more interesting to think of them as different potential uses of the
same genetic resource.
269 See Norman Daniels, Is There a Right to Health Care and, if so, What Does It Encompass?,
in A COMPANION TO BIOETHICS 362 (Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer eds., 2d ed. 2009).
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positions in terms of creating incentives, weighing costs and benefits, and
maximizing value.  The neoclassical law and economics frame is so ubiqui-
tous and unquestioned within these discussions that it almost goes unno-
ticed.  Ironically, however, the neoclassical economic approach for
understanding genetic ownership ultimately falls short of capturing the plu-
ral and incommensurable values implicated by recognizing—or failing to rec-
ognize—ownership interests in DNA.
III. FAILURE OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC THEORY FOR GENETIC OWNERSHIP
The hegemony of neoclassical economic theory has gone largely unques-
tioned in the law and in the legal scholarship surrounding genetic owner-
ship.  Yet as a lens for understanding the various interests at stake when
deciding who should own genetic data, it is inadequate.  Thinking merely in
terms of market value, incentives, costs, and benefits ignores the multivariant
nature of the issues surrounding genetic ownership.  As such, neoclassical law
and economics fails both doctrinally (in terms of justifying the current status
of the law) and intuitively (in terms of explaining people’s moral intuitions
surrounding genetic ownership).  Part III establishes that—despite the popu-
larity of the neoclassical economic approach—it is incomplete as a theory of
genetic ownership.
A. Doctrinal Failures
There are two major doctrinal failures in viewing genetic ownership
through a neoclassical law and economics lens.  First, a true wealth-maximiz-
ing utilitarian property model in this context would favor a genetic takings
doctrine.  If researchers thought enough value could be generated from the
DNA of a particular person or group, it might be well worth the effort to
obtain that genetic data, even over strong objections or in the face of possible
harm.  Second, while some of the new commercial rights in DNA may be
intended to incentivize research participation, neoclassical law and econom-
ics does not adequately explain the expanding set of genetic ownership
rights, especially given concerns related to chilling research and dead hand
control.
1. Informed Consent
Utilitarianism has appeal in broad theoretical terms but requires its
adherents to commit to some morally dubious outcomes.  The infamous trol-
ley problem, which asks the reader whether she should redirect a runaway
train headed for five people onto a different track where there is only one
person who will be harmed, exemplifies the dilemma.270  A true utilitarian
would say that it is preferable to sacrifice one person to save five.  The good
of individuals or minorities is thus subsumed into the collective good.  Utilita-
270 See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395 (1985).
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rianism privileges the interests of the many over the interests of the few, even
when the result is unpleasant for the minority.271
As noted, with respect to genetic information, a utilitarian framework
would therefore favor using someone’s DNA without her consent—or even
against her objections—if the proposed use would generate enough value.
Take for example an indigenous population that has a particularly desirable
genetic makeup but is isolated and impoverished.  Even if the group itself has
no opportunity to benefit and has strongly held beliefs against such research,
obtaining and using their genetic information is clearly favorable under a
pure Benthamite utilitarian regime, assuming the research would produce
sufficient welfare.272  Hence, a utilitarian view of genetic ownership could at
least permit—and at worst encourage—the exploitation of minorities, so
long as the resulting research generates enough net value.273
In other words, utilitarianism brings the possibility of a genetic takings
doctrine.274  With adequate justification, the government—or perhaps even
a private party—could theoretically seize an individual’s genetic information
and use it against her will.  Of course, the Fifth Amendment would require
“just compensation” for any such takings.275  In his recent article, Contreras
effectively advocates a genetic takings doctrine, arguing that when stubborn
individuals refuse to participate in valuable research it undermines impor-
tant interests in social justice and public health.276  Instead, he advocates per-
mitting unconsented research on genetic data and then compensating
people later if they experience harm.277
271 See SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 105 (describing how utilitarianism can end
up disadvantaging minorities).  For more on distributional concerns, see infra note 376
and accompanying text.
272 One could understand the infamous holding in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005), which justified the taking of a family home by a city corporation to further
economic development, in these terms.
273 In fact, utilitarianism would arguably support even more harmful and invasive stud-
ies than unconsented genetic research.  Imagine a situation in which excruciatingly tortur-
ing one individual would create huge medical advances for society as a whole and would
save millions of lives.  Now also imagine that the torture could be done in complete secret
and that no one would ever discover it.  It would seem that a true utilitarian would have to
support such a scenario.  To act differently would be to effectively renounce utilitarianism.
See SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 69–71 (discussing a similar hypothetical).
274 A taking occurs when the government seizes private property for public use. See 2A
JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01 (3d ed. 2006).
275 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
276 See Contreras, supra note 146, at 31–32.
277 See id. at 37–39 (stating that “rather than requiring informed consent from contrib-
utors of genetic data to a study, data-based research should be broadly permitted without
consent”).  Yet even Contreras opposes torture.  He seems to assume that once research
leads to physical and psychological harm it falls outside the realm of law and economics,
but he declines to explain why. See id. at 11–12 (discussing the Tuskegee Syphilis Study
and other examples of unethical research).  One possible reason is that Contreras believes
that research on data and research on human subjects are fundamentally different. See id.
at 15 (asserting that “data-based research is materially different than the invasive noncon-
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The possibility that researchers and the biotech industry might want to
override the rights of the few to serve the interests of the many is not mere
conjecture.  Various individuals and populations have had their DNA taken
and used without their consent, over their objections, against their interests,
or without any benefit to them.  Well-known examples, of course, include
Henrietta Lacks, John Moore, and the Havasupai.  And there are still others.
In addition to the Havasupai, researchers have targeted other indige-
nous people thought to have uniquely appealing genetic profiles.278
Researchers have repeatedly hounded the Kanaka Maoli, an isolated group
of Native Hawaiians, for their genetic material, despite their belief that their
genetic information is “sacred and inalienable.”279  Attempts to profit from
indigenous populations happen internationally as well.  One company, Axys
Pharmaceuticals, successfully patented and commercialized genetic data
from the entire impoverished island nation of Tristan da Cunha; a small Jew-
ish community in India; inhabitants of Easter Island; and families living in
isolation in Brazil and China.280  Although Axys obtained consent for the
samples it collected, it is unclear whether these populations truly understood
exactly what they were consenting to.  In short, it is unclear whether the con-
sent was meaningful, especially given the poverty and lack of education of the
groups being studied.  The U.S. government has even gotten in on the
action, obtaining and doing lucrative research on the tissue of a Guaymi
Indian woman from Panama.281  The Guaymi challenged the patents, going
all the way to the United Nations.  Ultimately, the United States withdrew its
patent application but continues to sell the cell line.
While these kinds of efforts line the pockets of researchers and the
biotech industry, they also may violate the populations’ dignity, autonomy,
privacy, and cultural or religious beliefs.  Harriet Washington has drawn par-
allels between these issues regarding genetic ownership and historical con-
flicts over real property, asserting that the bioprospecting of indigenous
groups represents a new form of colonialism.282  Of course, these examples
assume questionable consent from and possible harm to the studied popula-
tion and no benefit or meaningful compensation in return.  Yet even under a
genetic takings doctrine that offers just compensation, research may impli-
cate certain sacred interests like religious beliefs or matters of human dignity
for which no amount of money would truly make the injured party whole
again.
sensual research condemned at Nuremburg and Tuskegee and even the damaging psycho-
logical experimentation carried out by Milgram and others”).
278 Indigenous people were of interest to researchers both because of their isolation as
well as their potential resistance to disease. See Harry, supra note 143, at 182–84; see also
Ching, supra note 136, at 687–88.
279 WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 295.
280 Id. at 290.
281 Id. at 291.
282 See id. at 287; see also Spinello, supra note 112, at 34; Ching, supra note 136, at
697–99, 701.
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Pursuant to the doctrine of informed consent, a researcher cannot sim-
ply go in and take a person’s genetic data without her permission—no matter
how lucrative or medically useful the potential research.  Likewise, a person
can refuse to participate in even highly valuable research for any reason—
rational or not—regardless of whether the benefits outweigh the costs.  In
theory, under current law, people can choose not to participate in research
when there is absolutely no harm to them whatsoever and the research would
have massive market value.  As such, a robust informed consent doctrine inevi-
tably leads to genetic ownership market failures.  And these decisions can be
longstanding.  If an individual fails to give consent during her lifetime,
researchers cannot simply decide to go in and study her genetic data after
she dies.283  Thus, informed consent arguably creates dead hand control.284
Informed consent protects individual, not collective, interests.  Advo-
cates of informed consent caution against introducing any cost-benefit analy-
sis into the doctrine because doing so could weaken protections and result in
a regime of de facto consent for a significant portion of research.285  Rather
than focusing on maximizing welfare, informed consent protects ideals like
justice, beneficence, and human dignity.286  Informed consent is, therefore,
decidedly anti-utilitarian and can lead to outcomes that favor individual
rights over wealth creation and net social welfare.287  Given informed con-
sent’s rejection of value monism and cost-benefit analysis, a purely neoclassi-
cal economic account cannot fully explain informed consent.
2. Growing Genetic Ownership Rights
According to Demsetz, property rights emerge to internalize externali-
ties.  Property will not arise if the costs of creating and enforcing an owner-
ship regime outweigh its benefits.  Arguably, however, the costs of a genetic
ownership regime may well exceed the welfare it produces.
As explained in Part II, many scholars tend to be skeptical of allocating
too many interests in genetic data, particularly for individual people.  Setting
aside the genetic comedies described above, fears related to anticommons,
collective action problems, and perverse incentives have historically carried
the day.288  Judging from the extensive scholarship on the subject, many
commentators believe genetic ownership rights, including patents, informed
consent, and negotiated rights to possess and destroy, actually stand in the
283 See Contreras, supra note 146, at 26–28 (discussing dead hand control).
284 See id.
285 See Rothstein, supra note 208, at 426.
286 Id.
287 See Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 55, 56 (1984).
288 Arguments for giving people rights in their genetic data are relatively new with
much of the writing in this area taking place in the last year or two. See, e.g., Daley &
Cranley, supra note 16; Evans, supra note 209, at 653–54; Karow, supra note 183; Kish &
Topol, supra note 212; Lash, supra note 185.  By contrast, arguments against individual
ownership predate Moore, which was decided in 1990.
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way of welfare creation by stymieing research.  The general consensus seems
to be that too many genetic ownership rights already exist—whether held by
researchers, private companies, or individuals—and that those rights lead to
inefficient use and genetic market failures.  Following this line of reasoning,
the solution then seems to be loosening the binds to allow genetic data to
flow more freely and efficiently.
Yet despite this skepticism, individual entitlements in genetic data con-
tinue to grow.  In addition to the right to exclude inherent in informed con-
sent, courts appear increasingly open to conversion claims.  Beyond the right
to exclude, people are enjoying new rights to access and to commercialize
their genetic data.  Moreover, states continue to consider creating their own
sets of genetic ownership.289  Many of these actual and implied genetic own-
ership rights are not designed to promote wealth or to create welfare.  As
noted, autonomy is the basis for informed consent.  Likewise, the right to
access is about giving individuals the ability to view and potentially act on
their genetic data.  Individuals have expressed resentment that they have to
go through a third party to get information about themselves, and instead
favor direct, unfettered access.290  The desire for access does not appear
grounded in market value but rather autonomy and a sense of identity.  The
fact that some individuals seeking access want those rights solely for the abil-
ity to give them away further reinforces the position that values beyond
wealth are in play.291
Moreover, unlike paying people for participating in research, many of
the new genetic ownership rights are not designed to create incentives for
any particular welfare-creating action.  These new rights give people some-
thing in exchange for nothing and without the expectation that individuals
will respond in any particular way.  Thus, they cannot be explained by
rational choice theory.
Because these new genetic ownership rights are potentially costly to
enforce and could stifle research, they may decrease—rather than increase—
net welfare.  Moreover, they are not designed to prompt people to engage in
any particular set of rational behaviors.  As such, neoclassical law and eco-
nomics does not readily offer an explanation for their existence.
B. Intuitive Failures
Not only is neoclassical law and economics incomplete as a legal theory
of genetic ownership, it also clashes with core intuitions.  People have two
primary, and perhaps conflicting, intuitions about the ownership of genetic
data.  First, a significant proportion of the population believes that they
289 See supra note 161.
290 See Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, American DNA: The Politics of Potentiality in a Genomic Age, 54
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S7 577, 580 (2013).
291 See infra note 374 and accompanying text.
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should—or even that they do—own their own genetic data.292  This belief
seems to come from an identity affiliation people experience with their
genetic information and is perhaps the driving force behind the biorights
movement.293  Second, individuals have argued that genetic data is too per-
sonally meaningful to be left to the market.  And third, some evidence shows
that compensation may actually decrease people’s willingness to participate
in research.  Intuitions about personal ownership, commodification anxiety,
and decreased research altruism all seem to be rooted in concerns about
genetic data totally unrelated to its financial worth.
1. Personal Ownership
When President Obama declared “I would like to think that if somebody
does a test on me or my genes, that that’s mine . . .” he was expressing the
commonly held intuition that we own our genetic information.294  Often
these arguments are based on the notion that owning one’s own genetic
information is “natural” or “a basic right.”295  Perhaps we have a strong intui-
tion in favor of genetic ownership because, at the advent of the Human Gen-
ome Project, researchers presented genetic information as the biological
blueprint for our uniqueness as persons.296  Casting DNA as the source of
our individuality supports the proposition that genetic information might
rightfully—perhaps exclusively—belong to the person from whom it
came.297
292 Scholars on all sides of the genetic ownership debate manage to agree on this point.
See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 146, at 6 (noting “a widespread belief that individuals ‘own’
their personal [health] data [and genetic information]”); Evans, supra note 209, at 659
(observing that a 2014 survey indicated that of people who track their health data “54%
believe they own their data; 30% believe they share ownership with the sensor company or
service provider that enables collection of their data; [and] 4% believe the service provider
owns the data,” while “only 13% profess indifference”); Rothstein, supra note 208, at 427
(indicating that “many individuals strongly believe that their biological specimens and
health records ‘belong to them’”); Yakowitz, supra note 241, at 63  (explaining that
“[m]any people want (and probably believe they have) a property interest in information
that describes them”).  It is not surprising then that people have expectations regarding
what they will be told when research is done on their genetic data. See Kulynych & Greely,
supra note 174, at 96.
293 See Daley & Cranley, supra note 16.
294 Davis, supra note 9.
295 See Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding
of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 750–58 (2004) (outlining the arguments in
favor of, but ultimately rejecting, the property model for protecting genetic information). 
See generally Pilar N. Ossorio, Property Rights and Human Bodies, in WHO OWNS LIFE? 224–25
(David Magnus et al. eds., 2002) (reasoning that individuals may be the initial owners of
their bodily materials).
296 See George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded ‘Future Diaries,’
270 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2346 (1993).
297 See Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 49 (Mark A. Rothstein
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Perhaps not surprisingly, individuals have raised concerns about iden-
tity, dignity, privacy, and autonomy related to genetic information.  To them,
genetic data has intrinsic, noncommercial value because it relates to their
sense of self.298  23andMe capitalizes on this perceived connection between
genetic information and identity when marketing its products.  The front of
its test kit reads “Welcome to You” and its website entices potential consum-
ers with the phrase “23 pairs of chromosomes.  One unique you.”299  Another
company, ConnectMyDNA, markets one of its products as a “DNA Self-Dis-
covery Starter Kit.”300  Considering this framing, it is not terribly surprising
that some people felt violated when 23andMe turned around and sold their
genetic information to the highest bidder in 2015.
The two manifestos posted on the UnPatient website are also instructive.
The organization declares: “Data that reflects you should belong to you.  You
should control access.  These include: your genetic code, your lab data, and
your images to name a few.  These should be property to use as the owner
sees fit.”301  The UnPatient Health Data Ownership Manifesto articulates a
series of genetic ownership rights.302  In this single document, the founders
of UnPatient blend descriptive and normative claims, asserting rights to own-
ership and access alongside rights to privacy and human dignity.  While the
right to profit from data is certainly a crucial element to UnPatient’s plat-
form, commercial interests are far from the only values at stake.
But the belief that genetic information is linked to a sense of self pre-
dates 23andMe’s clever advertising campaign and UnPatient’s heart-felt
ed., 1997); Jeffery Lawrence Weeden, Note, Genetic Liberty, Genetic Property: Protecting Genetic
Information, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 611, 617 (2006).
298 Somewhat hyperbolically, one author declares that “[t]here is no information more
personal and private[ ] than an individual’s genetic information,” as it “defines who we are
as individuals both physically and mentally.”  Deborah L. McLochlin, Comment, Whose
Genetic Information Is It Anyway? A Legal Analysis of the Effects that Mapping the Human Genome
Will Have on Privacy Rights and Genetic Discrimination, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
609, 609 (2001).  Another proclaims that “[g]enes and the information they contain are
fundamental building blocks of a people’s identity.”  Ching, supra note 136, at 687; see also
Weeden, supra note 297, at 627 (referring to genetics as “our biological identity”).  In a
similar vein, in a statement before the Senate, Senator Pete Domenici called the human
genome “a blueprint containing the most personal and most private information that any
human being can have” and described genetic information as “the essence of our individu-
ality.” Id. at 631 (quoting 151 CONG. REC. S1595, S1595 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (state-
ment of Sen. Domenici)).  More reasonably, Sonia Suter simply writes that “our genetic
information is about us, and it is deeply connected to our sense of ourselves.”  Suter, supra
note 295, at 737.  Anita Allen has referred to DNA as “the thing that makes individuals
special and perhaps unique.”  Allen, supra note 297, at 49.
299 See 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com.
300 I have received many emails from Groupon marketing this test. See $29 for a DNA
Self-Discovery Test Kit from ConnectMyDNA (US $89.95 Value), GROUPON, https://www.group
on.com/deals/dc-bst-connectmydna-abbotsford (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
301 Health Data Ownership Manifesto, UNPATIENT, http://unpatient.org/health-data-own-
ership-manifesto/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
302 See id.
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manifestos.  For example, in arguing for his conversion claim, one theory
Moore asserted was that he had a property right in his persona.  Moore
asked, “If the courts have found a sufficient proprietary interest in one’s per-
sona, how could one not have a right in one’s own genetic material, some-
thing far more profoundly the essence of one’s human uniqueness than a
name or a face?”303  Although Moore surely had commercial interests in
asserting rights in his genetic data, he also asserted that the researchers vio-
lated his dignity and sense of self, holding his “genetic essence . . .
captive.”304
Like John Moore, Henrietta Lacks’s family expressed concerns related to
their mother’s dignity and identity in addition to their financial interests in
her genetic information.  As one researcher described a picture of chromo-
somes: “Within the DNA in that picture is all the genetic information that
made Henrietta Henrietta.”305  The Lacks family frequently referred to HeLa
cells as though the cells were themselves Henrietta306 and, by consequence,
the immortal cell line was keeping “Henrietta” alive.307
Not surprisingly, because people believe they own their genetic informa-
tion they tend to regard its unauthorized use as a violation.  John Moore
articulated an identity affiliation with his genetic data and his perception of a
property violation in the same breath, saying: “Without my knowledge or con-
sent, the doctors and the research institutions used a part of me for their own
gain. . . . They stole something from me.”308  Moore felt dehumanized.  He
stated that his doctors did not view him as a person but rather “a mine from
which to extract biological material.  I was harvested.”309  Likewise,
Henrietta’s daughter wrote that her mother was “[r]obbed of her cells” and
“[r]obbed [of] self.”310
Certain populations might have collective beliefs that relate to their
genetic data.  For example, the Havasupai objected to the population migra-
tion research on their genetic information because it directly contradicted
the tribe’s origin story and spiritual beliefs.311  While Contreras and others
303 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 490 (Cal. 1990); see also Harlan,
supra note 121, at 207 (quoting Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protec-
tion of Cultural Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 568 (1995)).
304 WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 11; see also supra note 200.
305 SKLOOT, supra note 150, at 264.
306 Id. at 262 (“‘Oh God,’ she gasped. ‘I can’t believe all that’s my mother.’”); see also
id. at 266 (“God, I never thought I’d see my mother under a microscope—I never dreamed
this day would ever come.”).
307 Id. at 164 (“Them doctors never said nuthin about keepin her alive in no tubes or
growin no cells.”); see also id. at 189 (“[T]heir mother will never die as long as the medical
science is around, she will always be such a famous thing.”).
308 McLellan, supra note 200 (emphasis added).
309 WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 43.
310 SKLOOT, supra note 150, at 196.
311 Drabiak-Syed, supra note 146, at 218 (describing how several of the studies based on
the Havasupai’s genetic data violated the tribe’s beliefs either about their spirituality or
their origin); Jonathan Turley, Indian Tribe Sues Researchers for Using Blood Samples to Disprove
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dismiss the Havasupai’s claims as overblown,312 the tribe experienced any
number of psychological and dignitary harms, like shame, humiliation, low
self-esteem, stereotyping, and stigmatization.313  Similarly, the president of
the Guaymi, when approached regarding genetic research on the tribe that
could potentially be patented, explained that “[i]t’s fundamentally immoral,
contrary to the Guaymi view of nature, and our place in it.  To patent human
material . . . to take human DNA and patent its products . . . violates the
integrity of life itself, and our deepest sense of morality.”314  Moreover, given
the small size and insularity of tribal populations, tribal membership raises
special concerns as research done on a single individual has the power to
impact the entire group.315
It is worth emphasizing that not all of these feelings of exploitation
resulted from illegal or unethical conduct.  In fact, taking Henrietta Lacks’s
cells, using the Havasupai’s blood samples for additional studies, and selling
access to the 23andMe database were all legally and ethically permissible, at
least when they occurred.  When people feel exploited, they are not thinking
in terms of efficiency or welfare creation.  They are expressing a range of
dignitary violations related to their sense of self, identity, bodily integrity,
privacy, and autonomy.  These things cannot be calculated in terms of dollars
and cents.  They are wholly unaccounted for by a purely economic approach
to genetic ownership.  The whole reason the Havasupai fought for the return
of their blood samples was because of their spiritual value.316  Money could
not compensate them.  Only returning the blood would make them whole.
2. Commodification Anxieties
An alternative intuition related to genetic ownership maintains that an
individual’s genetic data is too personal to be subject to the market.  Instead
of Moore’s and the Lacks family’s arguments that the genetic data is so inti-
mately a part of the person from whom it came that it must be that person’s
property, anticommodification arguments assert that allowing monetary
Religious Beliefs, JONATHAN TURLEY (Nov. 30, 2008), https://jonathanturley.org/2008/11/
30/indian-tribe-sues-researchers-for-using-blood-samples-to-disprove-religious-beliefs/
(explaining the research “challenge[d] their belief systems”); see also WASHINGTON, supra
note 11, at 293; Fischer, supra note 202; Harmon, supra note 146.
312 The researcher responsible for the study dismissed the tribe’s reaction as “hysteri-
cal.”  Drabiak-Syed, supra note 146, at 195–96 (“According to one of the plaintiffs’ attor-
neys, Robert Rosette, officials at ASU told him during mediation that there had been ‘no
broken bones—[the tribe had not] been harmed.’  Similarly, Markow classified the plain-
tiffs’ claims as ‘hysterical,’ insisting she was only ‘doing good science.’  Both comments
echo the sentiment that the tribe’s claims and request for damages merely represented an
extreme irrational or anti-science sentiment, rather than a genuine attempt to signify the
harm they incurred.” (alteration in original)).
313 See id. at 216–17.
314 Ching, supra note 136, at 700 (alterations in original) (quoting Philip L. Bereano,
Patent Pending: The Race to Own DNA, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at B5).
315 Drabiak-Syed, supra note 146, at 216–17.
316 Id. at 208.
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transactions for things we hold dear could cheapen their value and thus
weaken our social fabric.317  Perhaps for the same reasons the law prohibits
selling organs or babies, maybe people should not be able to profit from
their genetic information.318  Opponents of giving people property rights in
their genetic data argue that those entitlements threaten to commodify the
body.  Commodification anxieties are not about inefficiency but rather the
symbolic meaning of property.
According to this view, commodification is troubling because it could
take things with deep intrinsic human value and thrust them into the market.
Sonia Suter argues that “because of the importance of genetic information to
the self, identity, and formation of relationships of trust and intimacy, it
diminishes the personal value of our own genetic information to describe it
as a commodity.”319  Justice Arabian also took this perspective in his concur-
rence in Moore:
Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one’s own body
tissue for profit.  He entreats us to regard the human vessel—the single most
venerated and protected subject in any civilized society—as equal with the
basest commercial commodity.  He urges us to commingle the sacred with
the profane.  He asks much.320
Of course, the ultimate fear lies in the concern that at the bottom of the
slippery slope lurks the commodification of living, fully functioning, and
intact human beings.321
These critics of genetic ownership maintain that a property model is the
wrong approach to protect something that transcends market value.  Some
believe that giving people property rights in their genetic data takes a “reduc-
tionist view of personhood.”322  They assert that privacy law is better suited to
protecting interests related to identity and self.323  The court in Moore
adopted a similar view.  In rejecting Moore’s conversion claim, the court cau-
tioned against “forc[ing] the round pegs of ‘privacy’ and ‘dignity’ into the
square hole of ‘property.’”324  This preference comes largely from the belief
that property safeguards commercial interests, whereas noneconomic inter-
ests like dignity, autonomy, and bodily integrity are privacy’s dominion.325
317 See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 10
(2013); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1903 (1987).
318 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 2, at 51, 70–88. R
319 Suter, supra note 295, at 799–800.
320 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian, J.,
concurring).
321 Ossorio, supra note 295, at 224.
322 Id. at 232; see also Suter, supra note 295, at 737.
323 Allen, supra note 297, at 49; Suter, supra note 295, at 773–74.
324 Moore, 793 P.2d at 491.
325 See Ossorio, supra note 295, at 229; Suter, supra note 295, at 746, 769; see also Evans,
supra note 209, at 663; Miller, supra note 230, at 1226.  For example, in arguing for a
privacy paradigm over a property paradigm, Sonia Suter asserts that, to individuals like the
plaintiffs in Greenberg, “[genetic] information had personal value; to the researchers, it was
simply a commodity.”  Suter, supra note 295, at 741.  One scholar splits the difference,
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3. Declining Research Altruism
Finally, offering compensation may not actually increase the willingness
to participate in research.  According to neoclassical economic theory, pay-
ing someone to share her genetic data should generally create an added
incentive to participate in research.  However, studies have shown that finan-
cial incentives might actually backfire in certain circumstances.
People may want to participate in uncompensated research simply to
help humanity—not for personal gain.  Richard Titmuss strikingly demon-
strated that paying donors actually decreases their willingness to give
blood.326  He hypothesized that compensating people monetarily erodes
their sense of civic duty.  In other words, money may negatively impact
research altruism.  Similarly, Bruno Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee found
that, in the NIMBY context, offering people money for agreeing to site a
LULU in their community actually lowered the acceptance of the project
from 50.8% of residents to 24.6% of residents.327
This result confounds neoclassical economic theory.  Any added incen-
tive—no matter how small—should increase, not decrease, participation.  If
the willingness to participate in research when faced with financial incentives
declines, that result indicates that other values must be in play.  Neoclassical
economics tends to focus on extrinsic motivation, in the form of financial
compensation, to the detriment of internal motivations like loyalty, civic
duty, or generosity.  Perhaps people might feel that a low level of compensa-
tion cheapens their selfless act and undervalues their genetic information.328
Regardless of the explanation, it seems more is at stake than dollars and
cents.
* * *
Although neoclassical economics has enjoyed near unquestioned domi-
nance as a theory of genetic ownership, it is incomplete both doctrinally and
intuitively.  On the doctrinal level, it cannot adequately explain why
informed consent trumps even value-generating research or provide reasons
for the increasing legal recognition of individual genetic ownership rights
that do not incentivize research participation.  On an intuitive level, neoclas-
sical economic theory offers an unsatisfying explanation of how people feel
about owning and commercializing their genetic data.  Neoclassical econom-
ics therefore falls well short of being a complete model of genetic ownership
that is able to explain the relevant law and intuitions.
advocating privacy under particular circumstances and property under others.  Rao, supra
note 132, at 378–80.
326 See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1970).
327 Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 60, at 749.
328 Frey and Oberholzer-Gee assert that these results are consistent with rational choice
theory because the extrinsic motivation (price incentive) crowds out the intrinsic motiva-
tion (civic duty). Id. at 750–51.
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IV. PROGRESSIVE GENETIC OWNERSHIP
A neoclassical economic account fails to capture all the social interests at
stake within genetic ownership.  Entitlements in genetic data promote impor-
tant goals and values beyond maximizing welfare or ferreting out market fail-
ures.  This incompleteness invites consideration of whether the progressive
property framework would supply a superior model.  Part IV thus begins by
introducing a progressive model of genetic ownership.  It then applies that
model to some of the difficult cases from earlier in the Article.  This analysis
reveals that a progressive property approach—which would incorporate
wealth- and welfare-related concerns alongside deontological values—would
provide a more complete and satisfying account of genetic ownership.
A. Progressive Model of Genetic Ownership
Neoclassical law and economics fails as a model for the laws and regula-
tions governing genetic ownership because it cannot explain the existing and
emerging rights associated with genetic data or people’s behaviors and intu-
itions.  In particular, it ignores the plural values in play, like dignity, auton-
omy, privacy, identity, culture, and spirituality.  Because someone’s genetic
information may be personally meaningful and related to family, people will
not always behave like self-interested rational actors, calmly weighing costs
and benefits.
Progressive property may not settle all the possible issues that could arise
with respect to genetic ownership, but it provides a much more coherent and
complete theoretical framework than neoclassical law and economics.
1. Plural Genetic Values
Plural values abound in the context of genetic ownership.  Individuals
who provide biospecimens have concerns related to privacy, identity, and
autonomy, apart from their financial self-interest.329  Market value does not
fully account for the deontological concerns in play with respect to genetic
ownership.  And even a plural account of welfare is potentially problematic,
as the values associated with genetic ownership are complex and resist being
neatly collapsed or aggregated into a singular definition of welfare.  In fact,
pure consequentialism may be ill-suited to issues of bioethics generally.  As
Mark Rothstein has pointed out that “[t]he ethical basis of research ethics . . .
is not consequentialism, but deontology.”330  The Presidential Commission
for the Study of Bioethical Issues explicitly rejects treating people as a means
to an end, regardless of the potential benefit.331  Leading bioethicists are
clear that safeguarding dignity is central to regulating scientific research and,
329 See Rothstein et al., supra note 13, at 161–62.
330 Rothstein, supra note 208, at 426.
331 See id.
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consequently, protections for research subjects seek to prevent physical and
dignitary harms.332
Progressive property is particularly well-suited to unraveling the complex
issues surrounding genetic ownership because it can recognize—and account
for—the plural and incommensurable values at stake.  By embracing value
pluralism, progressive property theorists have identified diverse and varied
values implicated in ownership.  Among the virtues analyzed by Pen˜alver, for
example, are industry (material wealth), justice, and humility.333  He also
notes but does not explore the virtues of distributive justice, charity, liberal-
ity, and moderation.334  Singer’s democratic model of property incorporates
several different values, including autonomy, mobility, distribution and
access, freedom of contract (but with minimum economic and social stan-
dards), and both stability and change.335  Although not a self-identified
member of the progressive property school, Sunder discusses several diverse
values at stake in IP, such as efficiency, personhood, dignity, liberty, fairness,
and distributive justice,336 as well as autonomy, culture, democracy, equality,
and economic development.337
Progressive property, with its consideration of plural and incommensura-
ble values, fits comfortably within the framework of bioethics, which—at least
in theory if not in practice—is deontological in nature.  In fact, some
bioethicists have asserted that treating people as ends unto themselves
requires helping them achieve their desired goals and fostering their capabil-
ities as agents.338  In short, at least some bioethicists have advocated research-
ers taking a human flourishing approach to human subject research.
It should come as no surprise then that there are several contenders for
core values related to genetic ownership.  Much of genetic ownership deals
with research science.  Among the leading values associated with scientific
research are “communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized
skepticism.”339  The Belmont Report, the United States’ founding document
establishing the rights of human subjects, adopts respect for persons, benefi-
cence, and justice as its governing ethical principles.340  More recently, the
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health created a Framework for Responsi-
ble Sharing of Genomic and Health-Related Data.341  It grounded its
approach in two human rights from the Universal Declaration of Human
332 See id.
333 See Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 876–86.
334 See id. at 877.
335 See Singer, supra note 62, at 1054–55.
336 See Sunder, supra note 80, at 315.
337 See id. at 324–25.
338 See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 33, at 107.
339 Conley et al., supra note 21, at 634.
340 See NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regula-
tions-and-policy/belmont-report/index.html.
341 See Rothstein et al., supra note 13, at 170.
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Rights: the right of citizens to benefit from advances in medical research and
the right of scientists to be acknowledged.342  The Framework adopts the key
values of consent, privacy, security, and accountability.343
Autonomy, the ability to make one’s own decisions free from coercion, is
of course a key genetic value.  It forms the foundation of many important
legal doctrines, such as medical malpractice,344 the constitutional right to
refuse treatment,345 and—most importantly for this Article—informed con-
sent, in both the treatment346 and research contexts.347
Privacy is also frequently cited as a core value associated with genetic
ownership.  In her work on genetic privacy, Anita Allen identifies what she
calls “proprietary privacy”: privacy interests that deal with the appropriation
and ownership of human personalities.348  Proprietary privacy reveals the
clear connections between property, privacy, and autonomy.349  Allen
explains that “[p]roprietary genetic privacy is suggested by the idea that the
human DNA is a repository of valuable human personality.”350  Thus, one
way to provide meaningful protection for privacy would be through property
protections.351  In fact, at times, the distinction between property and privacy
may collapse completely.352
Genetic information can also raise identity concerns.  One need not
adopt the position that genetic information is determinative of identity to
adopt the position that it is relevant to identity.353  People’s genetic data
342 See id.
343 See id.
344 See Ingrid H. Heide, Negligence in the Creation of Healthy Babies: Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress in Cases of Alternative Reproductive Technology Malpractice Without Physical
Injury, 9 J. MED. & L. 55, 60 (2005) (“Medical malpractice has historically been used to
protect the individual’s interest in physical autonomy from interference and injury.”).
345 See Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 1393, 1397, 1400–02 (1999).
346 See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case
for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 430–31 (2006).
347 See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified in scattered titles of the C.F.R.).
348 Allen, supra note 297, at 33.
349 See Radin, supra note 5, at 957 (explaining that “the personhood perspective is often
implicit in the connections that courts and commentators find between property and pri-
vacy or between property and liberty”).
350 Allen, supra note 297, at 49.
351 See Miller, supra note 230, at 1223. But see id. at 1223–24 (invoking the economic/
noneconomic, property/privacy dichotomy rejected by this Article above).
352 When arguing in favor of an antidiscrimination paradigm for protecting genetic
information (and by consequence against a privacy paradigm), Anita Silvers and Michael
Stein actually equate privacy and property, stating that “[o]n the privacy model, a person’s
genetic information is her property and, consequently, should be under her control.”
Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic Discrimina-
tion, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1341, 1355 (2002).
353 Some scholars engage in a fallacy of genetic supremacy—i.e., arguing that saying my
genetic data is part of my identity is to say my genetic data is definitive of my identity—to
reject property interests.  For an example of such an argument, see Evans, supra note 209,
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clearly matters to them, regardless of whether it is anonymous.  In one study,
eighty-one percent of those surveyed indicated that they would want to know
about research on their identifiable samples and seventy-two percent said
they would want to know about the research being conducted on anonymous
samples.354  In fact, nineteen percent of those individuals believed that they
maintained rights in their anonymous sample.355  If identity was not a central
concern related to genetic ownership, then the concepts of “de-identifying”
or “anonymizing” would not carry nearly so much weight.  Thus, regardless of
the state of the law, people believe they have an identity interest in their
genetic data.
The Havasupai’s beliefs illustrate that genetic information can implicate
group identity as well.  Blood had a special significance to the tribe.356  Con-
sequently, while doing genetic research beyond diabetes did not harm the
tribe physically, it had a negative impact on their tribal identity in light of
their spiritual and cultural beliefs.357  Perhaps the clearest identity claims are
not in the As, Gs, Cs, and Ts themselves, but rather in what they represent:
ancestry, lineage, and cultural membership.
Of course, a discussion of genetic values would not be complete without
mentioning the values that have dominated the commentary for the last two
and a half decades: wealth and welfare.  Theorists dating back to Aristotle
have recognized the need to reward intellectual efforts to encourage virtuous
behavior.358  Rewarding innovation with financial gain can also encourage
the development of the capabilities necessary for human flourishing.359  A
progressive account of genetic ownership would not reject the ability of
genetic ownership entitlements to create wealth.  For instance, the biotech
industry also creates jobs and stimulates the economy.360  Employment and
economic growth surely contribute to human flourishing.  Thus, a progres-
sive approach to genetic ownership would acknowledge that offering incen-
tives might be necessary to encourage investment in scientific research.
Moreover, for some researchers, biotech executives, shareholders, and inves-
tors, genetic ownership could have an even more direct connection to flour-
ishing by contributing to their quality of life by allowing them to express
creativity, fulfill curiosity, and generate knowledge.
It is therefore worth emphasizing that, despite considering wealth and
welfare alongside other relevant values, progressive property takes research-
ers’ interests seriously.361  As a result, corporate entities like biotech compa-
at 678–79 (asserting that claiming genetic—or other health-related—data “is integral to
selfhood lends credence to Taylor’s alarm about impoverished ontological accounts of the
modern Self”).
354 Schmidt & Callier, supra note 199, at 307.
355 Id.
356 Drabiak-Syed, supra note 146, at 213–14.
357 Id.
358 ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 200.
359 Id. at 202.
360 Biotech is an incredibly profitable industry. See WASHINGTON, supra note 11, at 48.
361 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 200.
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nies will not always lose out in a progressive property analysis.362  Given the
need to strike a balance between promoting intellectual production and hon-
oring other important human values, a progressive approach to genetic own-
ership could, when appropriate, focus primarily on improving welfare
through increasing social and material wealth.363  However, when the poten-
tial ownership rights of the biotech industry undermine human flourishing,
the law should not respect them.  For instance, when Myriad aggressively
enforced its patents solely to maintain its patent monopoly it did so out of
pure self-interest and without regard for the public good—hardly the kind of
socially conscious virtue associated with human flourishing.
Progressive property incorporates several different kinds of values, and
consequently avoids the concerns associated with using value-monist utilitari-
anism as its operative framework.  For example, while informed consent
rights are potentially costly, we have them to safeguard autonomy, privacy,
and identity.  Growing ownership interests in genetic data also appear to be
grounded in these principles as they give individuals heightened control over
the genetic information for those very same reasons.  Thus, progressive prop-
erty, which would consider those values, explains these legal rights in a way
that neoclassical law and economics cannot.  Similarly, the concerns about
autonomy, privacy, and identity better explain why people believe they
should own their genetic data or why they fear its commodification.  Finally,
a desire to promote welfare—not wealth—explains why individuals who wish
to be good citizens might be willing to share genetic data for free but not
when compensated.  A value pluralist approach is thus superior to a value
monist one in part because it better accounts for the complex interests at
stake in genetic ownership, thereby offering justifications for informed con-
sent, growing ownership rights, intuitions of personal ownership, fears of
commodification, and possible declines in research altruism when faced with
financial incentives.
2. Genetic Communities
Progressive property’s communitarian vantage makes it particularly
appealing as a theory of genetic ownership for a second reason.  Neoclassical
law and economics does not capture the strong attachment people feel to
their genetic information.  Because of its ties to family and cultural heritage
(or even spirituality), genetic data can be deeply personal and emotional.
Just as Pen˜alver demonstrated with respect to the family home, people may
not behave like self-interested rational actors when it comes to their genetic
information.
As noted in Part I, genetic information is at once personal and commu-
nal.  Recall that while our DNA provides the basis for our biological individu-
ality, we also share 99.9% of our genetic information with our fellow human
362 See Alexander, supra note 1, at 817.
363 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 203.
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beings, and an even greater percentage with our family members.364  Natalie
Ram points out that the extent to which we share genetic data has implica-
tions for our ability to control that information.365  Understanding genetic
data in terms of genetic communities, as opposed to self-interested individual
rational actors, more accurately reflects the shared nature of our genetic
information.
Of course, the contributors of DNA are not the only communities rele-
vant to genetic ownership.  Genetic and genomic research itself requires a
different kind of community—research scientists themselves.  Much of sci-
ence is inherently collaborative.  Creating an innovation like the Mo or HeLa
cell line involves several different people, including the team of scientists
who grow the cells, the investors and institutions that fund and support them,
and the people that provide the genetic material.366
And of course, society as a whole constitutes yet another relevant com-
munity.  By their very nature, advances in genetic and genomic science are
meant to serve the common good.  Among the primary justifications for stud-
ying human genetics and genomics are to promote health and prevent dis-
ease.  When President Clinton announced the completion of the first phase
of the Human Genome Project in 2000, he emphasized the health impact of
that accomplishment, stating that genomic science “will revolutionize the
diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of most, if not all, human diseases” and
describing genetic information as “life-enhancing.”367  DNA forensics offers
another useful application of genetic and genomic science.  The use of DNA
for both conviction and exoneration has revolutionized the way law enforce-
ment investigates crimes and prosecutes suspects.368  Finally, human genetics
and genomics further the pursuit of knowledge, allowing us to engage in acts
of self-discovery about our identity as a species.369  All of these functions pro-
mote our shared welfare.  The core purpose of all the uses of genetic and
genomic science is thus to benefit humanity.
Furthermore, progressive property’s communitarianism captures con-
cerns related to the common good while also avoiding many of the distribu-
tive justice concerns raised by utilitarianism.  Instead of asking which
property allocation will produce the most aggregate welfare, it asks which
allocation will afford community members the basic rights and resources nec-
essary to live fulfilling lives.  This community orientation is key.  While utilita-
364 For a discussion of the shared nature of genetic information, see Ram, supra note
14, at 876–79.
365 Id. at 899.  Ram writes that “[i]f identifiable genetic information is worthy of protec-
tion, then legal institutions must take its inherently shared nature seriously.” Id. at 877.
366 SKLOOT, supra note 150, at 203–04 (quoting a researcher responsible for another
cell line arguing that “numerous parties” have “legitimate property interests in any cul-
tured cells”).
367 See Clinton Remarks, supra note 117, at 1500.
368 See generally John P. Cronan, The Next Frontier of Law Enforcement: A Proposal for Com-
plete DNA Databanks, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 119 (2000).
369 See, e.g., Kim TallBear, Narratives of Race and Indigeneity in the Genographic Project, 35
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 412, 413 (2007).
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rianism may initially appear egalitarian and communitarian, it would support
sacrificing individuals to the collective good, assuming the right utility
calculus.  Alternatively, progressive property acknowledges that communities
are themselves independent entities, made up of more than just the aggre-
gated preferences of their members.  Thus, exploiting one person—even if
that exploitation would personally benefit other members—could still harm
the community itself by violating its core values, such as privacy, autonomy,
or equality.
Progressive property’s communitarian orientation offers explanations
that the utilitarianism associated with neoclassical law and economics cannot.
Because the communal good is more than just the aggregation of interests,
human flourishing would not support taking and using an individual’s
genetic information without her consent, regardless of net welfare.  Progres-
sive property therefore both protects against exploitation and explains
informed consent in a way that neoclassical economic theory does not.
Regarding people’s intuitions of ownership and fears of commodifica-
tion, progressive property recognizes the role that communities play in iden-
tity.  Alexander explains that our identities are inevitably bound up in the
communities to which we belong.370  Nowhere is the connection between
identity and genetic community clearer than in the case of the Havasupai.  As
one author explains, “mishandling one person’s blood causes significant
damages and disrupts the community, the family, and that person’s spiritual
welfare.”371  Of course, genetic communities are not linked only by family
heritage.  They could also be the result of shared genetic traits, such as the
populations affected by Tay-Sachs or breast cancer.  Progressive property rec-
ognizes the value that genetic data might hold and can thus better explain
why people believe they should own their genetic information or fear its
commodification.
And, unlike neoclassical law and economics, progressive property’s com-
munitarianism can explain why people participate in research even without
financial incentives to do so.  Research participants sometimes speak in terms
of civic duties.372  Take breast cancer survivor and recent Myriad complain-
ant AnneMarie Ciccarella, who stated that she did not want access to her
genetic information for herself but rather so she could pass that data on to
researchers.373  She explained that, “I want to see that the research commu-
nity has access to every bit of data that has been generated from my body.”374
Similarly, the executive chairman of Genos described his company’s services
as “a way of being a philanthropist for [the] $400” cost of sequencing
because it enabled individuals to share their data with researchers.375  Pro-
370 Alexander, supra note 1, at 766–67.
371 Drabiak-Syed, supra note 146, at 214.
372 See Lee, supra note 290 (discussing civic republicanism as a motivation for personal
genetic testing).
373 Health Information Privacy Complaint, supra note 17, at 12.
374 See Hayden, supra note 17.
375 Karow, supra note 183.
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gressive property can therefore explain research altruism in a way that pure
neoclassical law and economics cannot.
3. Genetic Distributive Justice
Whereas progressive property’s value pluralism and communitarian
attributes offer better descriptive accounts for laws, intuitions, and behaviors,
distributive justice provides a better normative framework for law and poli-
cymaking than its neoclassical law and economics counterpart, cost-benefit
analysis.  While cost-benefit analysis has a place in bioethics, it should not be
the only analytical tool.
Analyzing costs and benefits collectively may generate deeply troubling
distributional questions and obscure key issues of social justice.  As both
Martha Nussbaum and Madhavi Sunder have made clear, utilitarianism
neglects distributive questions.376  By looking only to aggregated interests, as
a property theory, utilitarianism hides that a significant portion of wealth
may be concentrated among a small group of people, thereby masking even
serious disparities.  Thus, neoclassical economic theory, with its pure
Benthamite underpinnings, cannot begin to capture the distributive justice
concerns associated with genetic ownership.
By contrast, progressive property allows for redistribution.  As such, it
may avoid the sense of exploitation that tends to be overlooked in a neoclas-
sical economic regime.  In the case of Native American communities, one
scholar has criticized research on those populations as rendering them “pas-
sive pincushions” with no input on the studies being done on their bios-
pecimens.377  Criticisms of this practice reflect the utilitarian tendencies of
biomedical research: researchers have thought in terms of the benefit to soci-
ety as a whole and not in terms of the individuals affected or the principles of
the tribes to which they belong.378  A progressive property approach would
not allow such a result.  It would ensure that the idea of genetic ownership
attends to the values—like dignity, cultural identity, and spirituality—that
were implicated by, but ignored in, the Havasupai case.
Under a progressive property framework, individuals would have suffi-
cient genetic ownership rights to allow them to make meaningful choices
about how to exercise their capabilities.  Acknowledging genetic ownership
interests for people who contribute genetic material could facilitate their
flourishing in a variety of ways.  Having those rights would create the neces-
sary trust and predictability for people to feel comfortable participating in
genetic and genomic research.  Individual genetic ownership rights may then
assuage anxieties about misuse and exploitation.
376 Sunder, supra note 80, at 284.
377 Harry, supra note 143, at 189 (citing JONATHAN MARKS, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE 98%
CHIMPANZEE 217 (2002)); see also Drabiak-Syed, supra note 146, at 212 (quoting Harry,
supra note 143, at 189).
378 See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 146, at 212.
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Additionally, legally recognized genetic ownership rights could result in
financial compensation or access to new technologies.  Sources of genetic
data would enjoy some measure of wealth in the exchange.  This wealth
exchange could contribute to flourishing by giving DNA contributors access
to resources that could improve their health and well-being, such as genetic
and genomic diagnostics and treatments, or simply money to improve their
lot in life.
Finally, an individual may willingly forgo her genetic ownership rights
and donate her DNA because she finds that choice personally fulfilling.  One
benefit of recognizing genetic ownership rights for sources of biospecimens
is that it provides the opportunity to be generous,379 and generosity is fre-
quently part of a life well-lived.  Perhaps counterintuitively, part of the value
of genetic ownership rights for people who contribute DNA is their ability to
give those very same rights away.
As in the context of real property, the existence of community can cre-
ate obligations to fellow community members in the context of genetic data.
Recall that communities are necessary for flourishing because having and
exercising capabilities requires social structures that provide the necessary
resources and opportunities.  In stark contrast to rational choice theory, a
progressive property approach to genetic ownership does not assume unin-
hibited self-interest.  Instead, it obliges both members of the biotech industry
and people who contribute DNA to consider the interests of other stakehold-
ers when invoking their genetic ownership rights.  Progressive property by its
very nature not only avoids exploitation but also promotes dignity and
respect.  Such an approach to genetic ownership would repair the damage
done to research relations by the stories of John Moore, Henrietta Lacks, the
Greenberg plaintiffs, and the Havasupai.
B. Applying the Model
Having made the case for progressive genetic ownership and laid out its
basic characteristics, the Article now revisits the genetic ownership entitle-
ments from Part I to assess how a progressive property approach might
address some famous genetic ownership controversies.
1. Right to Exclude
The need for people to participate in research is akin to a NIMBY prob-
lem.  While society as a whole could benefit from the LULU or the research,
only a particular subset of individuals personally bears the risks and potential
costs of those endeavors.  As argued by Contreras, the right to exclude via the
doctrine of informed consent constitutes the greatest obstacle for researchers
and members of the biotech industry.  While some genetic companies are
entertaining offering financial incentives, they run the risk of crowding out
other, nonmonetary reasons for research participation.  Does progressive
379 See ALEXANDER & PEN˜ALVER, supra note 6, at 83–84.
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property offer a better solution for the genetic ownership controversies that
implicate a right to exclude?
It does.  To illustrate, consider the Havasupai who asserted that they
were denied the opportunity to exclude research on mental illness, migratory
patterns, and inbreeding.  Recall that a district judge in that case dismissed
the tribe’s informed consent claim, finding that by having their blood drawn
and signing broad consents, the tribe had effectively agreed to the
research.380  This result is arguably satisfying from a neoclassical economic
perspective.  The tribe had incurred any costs related to the research when
members had their blood drawn for the diabetes study, and using broad con-
sents promotes efficiency by eliminating the costs of having to go back and
obtain additional consent for subsequent research.  However, progressive
property would yield a different result.  A judge adopting a progressive prop-
erty framework would consider the genetic values at stake within the relevant
communities.  Some values will always be present in the context of genetic
research, such as the social welfare concerns associated with scientific
advancement and the efficient use of scarce resources.  Another near ubiqui-
tous value in genetic research, at least in the United States, is industry or
material wealth, assuming the resulting innovations would be commercial-
ized.  Finally, society has an overarching interest in justice and human dig-
nity.  Researchers themselves will have their own autonomy and identity
concerns related to their work.  For the Havasupai, the relevant values per-
tain to respect for identity, personhood, dignity, and culture, as the
nondiabetes research violated their beliefs and was potentially stigmatizing.
The judge hearing the case for the Havasupai might well then decide that
one line of research would so violate the tribe’s deontological interests that
no amount of social benefit or wealth creation could justify it without
obtaining clear subsequent consent.
However, a progressive property–oriented judge will not always find in
favor of enforcing informed consent–based rights to exclude.  The Havasupai
cited very clear deontological concerns that the research on their genetic
data raised.  By contrast, the parents in the Texas newborn blood spot con-
troversy had less specific objections.  Mainly, they were outraged that uncon-
sented samples were being used for research of any kind, not because any
proposed research project violated a specific moral value.  In cases that do
not raise specific deontological concerns, a judge might well decide that the
potential benefits of the research make a broad consent—or even an excep-
tion to the doctrine of informed consent, as with the newborn screening pro-
gram—acceptable under the circumstances.
2. Right to Access
Individuals also enjoy certain access rights in their genetic data.  Like the
right to exclude, judges could decide whether enforcing those rights in a
380 See Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ., No. 04-CV-1290, 2005 WL 6199562, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 3, 2005).
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given context would promote human flourishing.  If allowing access would,
for example, empower individuals and facilitate advances in research, a judge
may be inclined to enforce the access rights to genetic test results granted
under the HIPAA regulations broadly.  A broad construction of access rights
would be most useful in situations where database administrators, like Myr-
iad, are trying to restrict access due to perverse incentives.
As with the right to exclude, a progressive property–oriented judge may
not always decide that exercising a right to access will lead to human flourish-
ing.  State newborn screening programs offer a useful analogy.  Texas is not
the only state that pricks the heels of its newborns.  Every state has a screen-
ing program that tests for certain genetic conditions.381  While the number
of tests varies by state, all of the programs share at least one common attri-
bute: they only screen for early onset, treatable diseases.382  Likewise, adop-
tion agencies conduct genetic screening of children before placing them, but
again typically only for diseases that manifest during childhood.383  In other
words, a newborn screening program or an adoption agency will not test a
child for cancer or Alzheimer’s risk.  Restricting genetic testing to childhood
diseases demonstrates that sometimes stakeholders believe that it is best not
to access certain genetic information.384  A judge might then grant a poten-
tial adoptive parent’s request for genetic test results about childhood disease
but deny it with respect to a request for genetic test results about conditions
that manifest in adulthood.
3. Right to Commercialize
Judges could opt to enforce individuals’ commercial rights negotiated
via contract using a progressive property model.  Imagine a contractual dis-
pute over research proceeds from a lucrative line of study, in which research-
ers had agreed to share profits and pay royalties for accessing the genetic
data.385  A judge hearing the case could consider the various values in play
when deciding whether to enforce the contract.  How integral was the
genetic data to the research?  What were the expectations of the parties?
Would failing to enforce a particular result compromise the DNA contribu-
tor’s autonomy or sense of identity?  Would enforcing the right undermine
future socially valuable research?  All of these questions could inform how
broadly a judge reads the contract or resolves the dispute.
381 Ang Xu et al., Delays in State Adoption of Newborn Screening Tests, PEDIATRICS, Dec.
2017, http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2017/12/18/peds.2017-0300.
382 Id.
383 See AM. SOC’Y OF HUMAN GENETICS SOC. ISSUES COMM. & AM. COLL. OF MED. GENET-
ICS SOC., ETHICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES COMM., Genetic Testing in Adoption, in 66 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 761, 761–62 (2000).
384 See id. at 764; see also Ellen Wright Clayton, Screening and Treatment of Newborns, 29
HOUS. L. REV. 85, 103 (1992) (discussing the effects of labeling a child as “deviant” via
newborn screening).
385 See Rao, supra note 132, at 375.
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Of course, not all people want to commercialize their genetic data.  Take
the Greenberg plaintiffs, who freely gave their genetic information with the
expectation that all resulting research would remain in the public domain.386
For them, the foremost concern was diagnosing and treating the disease.
When they settled their case, one condition of the settlement agreement was
that their genetic data would not be aggressively commercialized.387  A judge
might then also be confronted with an agreement not to commercialize
genetic data.  Using progressive property as the predominant model would
allow the judge to consider how enforcing an agreement not to commercial-
ize would impact human flourishing.
* * *
As compared to neoclassical economic theory, a progressive property
approach better reflects the plural values, communitarian interests, and dis-
tributive justice concerns that are inherent in the genetic ownership context.
Accordingly, it offers superior descriptive and normative accounts of genetic
data.  Value pluralism and communitarianism more readily explain the exis-
tence of genetic ownership rights, as well as people’s intuitions and behaviors
related to their genetic data; and distributive justice offers a normative
approach that reflects concerns about exploitation and social justice.  The
advantages of a progressive property lens play out when revisiting several of
the genetic ownership entitlements and controversies outlined in Part I.
CONCLUSION
The preceding pages have demonstrated that progressive property has
much to offer in genetic ownership disputes—yet do disputes over genetic
ownership have anything to offer progressive property?  It might initially
seem that successfully applying progressive property to genetic data indicates
its superiority across all kinds of property disputes.  After all, the differences
between a parcel of real property and a DNA sequence are immediately
apparent.  But genetic data shares more with land than might initially
appear.  Both are unique, both are inheritable, and both are tied to family
and community.  This Article concludes by outlining the analogy between
land and genetic data to consider progressive property’s utility beyond land
use.
Genetic data differs from property in several key ways.  First, land is both
tangible and rivalrous.  The limited and finite supply of land is the very rea-
son why the law tends to reject the notion that land is fungible.388  Once we
run out of land we cannot simply make more.389  And giving one person
rights in land may limit the ability of others to use that land.
386 See id. at 373.
387 Id. at 374.
388 See Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 832.
389 Of course, that does not stop people from trying. See, e.g., Samanth Subramanian,
How Singapore Is Creating More Land for Itself, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://
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By contrast, genetic data is neither tangible nor rivalrous.  Unlike tracts
of land, or even blood and hair, two different parties can have complete pos-
session of the exact same genetic information at the exact same time and not
inhibit the other party’s use.390  If a lab is analyzing my DNA for a study, my
organs will still function, my cells will still replicate, and I can still pursue my
hopes and dreams.  The intangible, nonrivalrous nature of genetic data
makes it especially challenging to regulate.  While a landowner can build a
fence or a tollbooth, owners have more difficulty policing the use of genetic
data,391 especially once it is in the hands of a third party.
Because of its physicality, changes to land are determinative and endur-
ing.  As Pen˜alver observes, once you make a tract of land into a garbage
dump it will probably stay a garbage dump.392  Although genetic data is
arguably “fixed” (we are born with our genetic information and can do little
to change it), because DNA replicates, researchers can experiment with all
kinds of uses, discard a sample, and make more.
Moreover, land ownership—particularly homeownership—gives owners
access to nonfungible goods in a way genetic ownership does not.  These
goods include things like adult independence, personal responsibility, access
to the American dream, social personhood, the ability to craft one’s living
space to one’s preferences, access to communal resources like schools, and
social relationships among neighbors.393  There are not equivalents for
genetic data.  Put simply, you do not need a right in your genetic data in the
same way you need a place to sleep at night.  Consequently, genetic owner-
ship is not as immediately bound up with human flourishing.
Alienability represents yet another way that genetic data differs from
land.  Alienability is the characteristic of property that allows owners to trans-
fer rights.  However, we share our genetic information with our relatives
immutably and, even if we sell rights to access and use that data, we will never
be able to transfer away all of our genetic data.394
Given the profound differences between these two kinds of property,
successfully applying progressive property to genetic ownership seems to
demonstrate its applicability beyond land use.  If progressive property pro-
vides an equally effective lens for resolving ownership disputes both related
to land (a tangible, rivalrous, and scarce object of ownership) and related to
genetic data (an intangible, nonrivalrous, and replenishable object of owner-
ship), it suggests progressive property’s potential as a model for all types of
www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/magazine/how-singapore-is-creating-more-land-for-
itself.html.
390 As Pilar Ossorio quips, “If a researcher creates an immortalized cell line from my
cells and . . . licenses that cell line to a biotechnology company for a million dollars, that
will not prevent me from traveling on my vacation, writing a play, or getting a pet.”
Ossorio, supra note 295, at 232.
391 See Contreras, supra note 146, at 52.
392 See Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 829–30.
393 See id. at 835–38.
394 See Ram, supra note 14, at 903–04; see also Hall, supra note 192, at 657.
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conflicts over ownership.  However, the differences between land and genetic
data turn out to be largely superficial.
Indeed, genetic data and land may have more in common than meets
the eye.  First, both are unique.  Pen˜alver uses the uniqueness of land as his
point of departure in Land Virtues, explaining that the land—unlike most
other resources—“resists generalization.”395  Likewise, an individual’s
genetic data is unique.  Recall the discussion regarding the personal and
communal relevance of DNA.  Despite the fact that we share 99.9% of our
genetic information with other humans,396 that small bit of difference is
entirely our own.  Even identical twins, born from the same egg and sperm,
do not have the exact same genetic profiles.397  The uniqueness of our
genetic data is the very thing that raises concerns about the de-identifiability
of genetic information in research.  It would seem that if a researcher is stud-
ying genetic variation, the DNA could always be traced back to the individual,
or at least the family, from which it came.
Second, both land and genetic information are inherited, giving them
familial and intergenerational elements.  As Singer points out, people not
only acquire property through the market but also from their families, via
inheritance and marriage.398  This connection to family gives land an ele-
ment of intergenerational stability.399  Individuals may thus experience both
temporal and intergenerational psychological attachments to the land they
own if it has been in the family for a significant period of time.400  Land also
represents a connection to neighborhoods and communities.  The place
someone is born can shape her opportunities and preferences,401 raising
issues of intergenerational justice.
People also have psychological attachments to their genetic data that
include familial and temporal elements.  Parents pass down their genetic
information, which they received from their own parents, to their biological
children.  Hence, we share even more genetic similarity with our close rela-
tives than with the general population.  Genetic data literally ties us to our
ancestors through strings of DNA, giving our genetic profiles intergenera-
tional significance.  We are born into the same “genetic neighborhood” as
our parents and grandparents, sisters and brothers, cousins, and so on.
Although Ram discusses the involuntary sharing of genetic information with
family members to distinguish genetic data from property,402 we likewise do
395 Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 828.
396 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
397 See Anne Casselman, Identical Twins’ Genes Are Not Identical, SCI. AM. (Apr. 3, 2008),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/identical-twins-genes-are-not-identical/; Tia
Ghose, Identical Twins Are Genetically Different, Research Suggests, LIVE SCI. (Nov. 9, 2012),
https://www.livescience.com/24694-identical-twins-not-identical.html.
398 Singer, supra note 62, at 1022.
399 See Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 822, 830 (discussing intergenerational relevance of
land).
400 Id. at 830.
401 See id. at 831 (discussing the significance of neighborhoods).
402 See Ram, supra note 14, at 904.
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not choose the community into which we are born.  Furthermore, where we
are born may affect where we live in the future.  Even as adults, we do not
have free rein to select our communities because of the resources and
choices available to us.403  If we did, we might all live in Beverly Hills.  Our
genetic neighborhoods may then be more like our physical neighborhoods
than might first appear.
These shared attributes generate a complexity of values surrounding
both land and genetic data.  The unique, familial, and intergenerational
aspects are precisely what cause neoclassical economics to fail as a sound the-
oretical basis in both contexts.  Pen˜alver explains that it is “land’s intrinsic
complexity, and the complexity of its interactions with human well-being”
that makes a wealth-maximizing, rational actor account fall short.404  Because
of these deontological concerns, homeowners do not behave like rational
actors seeking only to maximize market value.405  He observes that at least
some of the failure of neoclassical law and economics in the context of land
use stems from the absence of markets for certain socially important values,
like preserving the wetlands, protecting endangered species, and providing
housing for the homeless.406  Another “nonmarketable good” inadequately
captured by cost-benefit analysis is the interest of future generations.407
Pen˜alver asks whether the tendency to discount the future effects of one’s
actions undermines the ability of a current owner to adequately account for
future concerns of the generations to come.408  The discounting of future
costs may raise issues of distributive justice that neoclassical economic theory
and utilitarianism would be hard-pressed to resolve.
Pen˜alver’s insights apply with equal force to genetic ownership.  Because
genetic data is unique and replete with familial and intergenerational mean-
ing, it confounds rational choice theory.  Likewise, there are not well-devel-
oped markets for deontological concerns related to genetic information like
autonomy, privacy, and identity.  Finally, genetic ownership also raises con-
cerns of discounting future costs.  As C.S. Lewis poignantly describes in The
Abolition of Man, genetic research may in fact lead to fewer—not more—
options for future generations.409  He explains:
[I]f any one age really attains, by eugenics and scientific education, the
power to make its descendants what it pleases, all men who live after it are
the patients of that power.  They are weaker, not stronger: for though we
may have put wonderful machines in their hands we have pre-ordained how
they are to use them.410
403 See generally David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation,
127 YALE L.J. 78 (2017).
404 Pen˜alver, supra note 1, at 847.
405 Id. at 834.
406 Id. at 850.
407 Id. at 853.
408 Id. at 854.
409 C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (1943).
410 Id. at 29.
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Lewis goes on to assert that “[t]he last men, far from being the heirs of
power, will be of all men most subject to the dead hand of the great planners
and conditioners and will themselves exercise the least power upon the
future.”411  Thus, the lack of markets for important values and the tendency
to discount future costs also affect genetic ownership.  In sum, despite their
fundamental differences, land and genetic data share common attributes,
and it is these commonalities that make a progressive property model appro-
priate for both.
While disputes involving land and genetic data may be particularly well
suited to progressive property, not all property conflicts require a value plu-
ralist, communitarian, and redistributive model.  The reason neoclassical law
and economics fails both with respect to land use and to genetic data stems
from specific qualities related to those forms of property and the parties who
are fighting over them.  With their uniqueness and their ties to family, com-
munity, and identity, both land and genetic data may implicate multiple plu-
ral and incommensurable values.  Likewise, disputes over ownership of these
assets affect communities with various kinds of concerns, not just individual
rational actors.  Finally, the relevant parties may not be equally situated with
respect to distribution.  Large development companies and the government
have significant advantages when acquiring and cultivating land and
researchers and biotech companies have significant advantages when com-
mercializing genetic data.
This observation even allows us to refine our understanding of progres-
sive property within land use.  Progressive property might be the proper lens
for resolving ownership conflicts when large developers or the government
come into low-income communities and seek to displace people with little
means for recourse.  However, neoclassical economic theory may be a per-
fectly sufficient theoretical lens when the property dispute occurs between
two equally sophisticated commercial entities driven only by economic con-
siderations.  In short, we may not need progressive property in the context of
commercial real estate.  Thus, it is the nature of the object of ownership, as
well as the parties involved, that dictates the appropriate property theory in a
given case.
In conclusion, genetic ownership demonstrates the versatility of the pro-
gressive view of property.  However, this case study does not establish progres-
sive property as a universally desirable theory.  Genetic data shares some
surprising commonalities with land, including uniqueness, a link to identity,
and community/family ties.  Thus, progressive property offers a useful lens
for ownership conflicts when the entitlement implicates plural and incom-
mensurable values, when the parties do not act with self-interest, and when
the dispute raises distributive concerns.  However, for conflicts involving fun-
gible assets that lack deontological significance or that do not raise questions
of distributive justice—such as shares of stock, mass-produced commercial
411 Id. at 30.
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goods, or even commercial real estate—neoclassical law and economics may
still offer a better approach.
